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The purpose of this thesis is to clarify the meaning of authenticity in Martin 
Heidegger‟s Being and Time. This is done first by situating the meaning of authenticity 
within the project as a whole, second through an exegesis of key parts of the text, and 
third, through an evaluation of certain scholarly commentaries. The ultimate aim is to 
argue against an interpretation of authenticity that carries an overly subjectivistic-
individualistic connotation.  
The second chapter seeks to provide the necessary context for the meaning of 
authenticity within the project of Being and Time as a whole. The goal is to make 
transparent the situation that Heidegger finds himself in when he conceives of the 
necessity for the concept of authenticity. Towards this end, it is necessary to highlight 
those commitments to phenomenology and hermeneutics that informs Heidegger‟s 
effort. 
The third chapter first introduces the various characterizations of authenticity that 
Heidegger offers in Being and Time and the problematic meaning they suggest. 
Subsequently, the third chapter aims at creating a context for the meaning of those 
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characterizations through an exegesis of the existentials of every existentiell disclosure 
of Dasein‟s being-in-the-world. By examining what it means for Dasein to be in the 
world in general, the goal is to narrow the scope of what authenticity can and cannot 
mean. 
The fourth chapter surveys certain commentaries on authenticity that argue in 
favor of a subjectivistic-individualistic emphasis for the meaning of authenticity. The 
goal is to isolate the key points in Being and Time that are used in support of these 
interpretations, and subsequently to use the frameworks  created in Chapters II and III to 
articulate why such commentaries are incorrect. Finally, Chapter IV gestures towards the 
right meaning of those descriptions of authenticity that carry a subjectivistic-
individualistic connotation in order to place them in the right context.     
The thesis concludes by suggesting that a non subjectivistic-individualistic 
interpretation fits more holistically with the other social-historical parts of the text, and 
that a subjectivistic-individualistic interpretation remains within the provenance of the 
kind of metaphysics that Heidegger wishes to distance himself from.  











“My goal is this: always to put myself in the place in which I am best able to 
serve, wherever my gifts and qualities find the best soil, the widest field of action. There 
is no other goal.” 
   --Narcissus (from Herman Hesse‟s Narcissus and Goldmund)  
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The stated aim of the project in Martin Heidegger‟s Being and Time is to seek an 
elucidation of the question of the meaning of being. Initially then, it should seem curious 
that the notion of man‟s authenticity should figure in so prominently into such a project. 
Furthermore, Heidegger himself offers little in terms of support for understanding this 
connection. Initially, Heidegger simply tells us that Dasein has two kinds of being—
authenticity and inauthenticity—and that these are based on the fact that Dasein is 
characterized by always being-mine (Heidegger 40). Due to this lack of context, it is 
perhaps little wonder that the meaning of authenticity finds a diverse range of 
interpretations in commentaries on Being and Time.  
In certain commentaries, authenticity takes on an overly subjectivistic-
individualistic emphasis at the expense of the social-historical passages that are also 
clearly important for a complete understanding of what it means to be authentic. But 
those that recognize the importance of the social-historical passages often simply point 
out the inconsistency of arguing for a subjectivistic-individualistic emphasis without 
placing those passages used to support such a view in their appropriate context. The 
ultimate aim, then, is to build up that context, thereby clarifying the various remarks that 
characterize authenticity in Being and Time.  
____________ 
This thesis follows the style of the MLA Handbook. 
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In order to do so, first it is necessary fill in the missing gap in Heidegger‟s 
presentation by providing the necessary context for the meaning of authenticity within 
the project as a whole. In a lecture on hermeneutics before the publication of Being and 
Time, Heidegger writes that any interpretation has three elements—a point of view, a 
direction of view, and a range of view—and that the interpretation can be made 
transparent only to the extent that its situation is clarified according to these three 
aspects.  
The possible accomplishment of interpretation and understanding, as well 
as the appropriation of the object that thereby occurs, are transparent to 
the degree that the situation—in and for which an interpretation 
develops—is illuminated according to the aspects just mentioned (Figal 
39).  
 
Of the three, the point of view is primary as it represents the basic prejudice that 
determines in what way the subject matter of the interpretation is to be appropriated. The 
first goal, then, is to make transparent the point of view out of which Heidegger‟s 
analytic of Dasein develops. To do so it is necessary to discuss those principles of 
phenomenology and hermeneutics that underlie the approach that Heidegger takes in 
pursuing his inquiry. Ultimately, by making transparent the situation within which 
Heidegger conceives of the necessity for the notion of authenticity, a context will be 
established for which the meaning of authenticity can come back to for its verification.  
The next step in establishing the proper context for authenticity will be to clarify 
those existential structures that describe what it means for Dasein to exist concretely in 
the world. Since Heidegger provides a fairly comprehensive account of the ontological 
constitution of this being, it is possible to create a context out of how Dasein is in the 
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world in general to help clarify what an authentic existentiell can and cannot reasonably 
entail.  
The final step is to evaluate directly the analyses present in certain commentaries 
that have strong subjectivistic-individualistic interpretations of authenticity. To this end 
it must be possible to locate exactly where in Being and Time these claims find their 
textual justification. The ultimate goal is to connect the meaning of authenticity as it is 
established for the project to the various characterizations of authenticity as they appear 
in the text. In doing so, the characterizations of authenticity that supposedly ground the 
subjectivistic-individualistic emphasis are reappropriated by an understanding that is 
more holistically situated in the project as a whole and in the existential understanding of 
Dasein.  
Ultimately, what seems to be the root of the problem in understanding 
authenticity in Being and Time is the difficulty of conceiving the being of Dasein in any 
way other than on the basis of subjectivity and a metaphysic of presence. After the 
publication of Being and Time, perhaps in recognition of precisely these difficulties in 
getting past subjectivity, Heidegger stresses that Dasein is meant as a “neutral” term that 
designates only the “metaphysical isolation of the human” (Figal 63-64). As part of 
establishing this neutral designation in Being and Time, Heidegger introduces the 
distinction between the ontological and the ontic, and the existential and the existentiell. 
As a result, the traditional notions of selfhood and subjectivity get split between this new 
landscape of categories and subsequently lose their meaning. As Francois Raffoul points 
out in regards to Dasein, "We are dealing then with a completely unprecedented kind of 
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solipsism, the concept of which unites isolation, individuation, and opening to others and 
to the world" (Raffoul 216). The difficulty and the challenge, is in thinking through these 
traditional ideas on the new basis that Heidegger establishes. 
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Fundamentally a work of ontology, the stated project of Martin Heidegger‟s Being and 
Time is to seek an answer to the question of the meaning of being. For Heidegger, this is 
a question that has been neglected in the history of western philosophy, passed over 
owing to its ubiquitousness or obtuseness or simply its emptiness. We use it and yet we 
are unable to articulate an adequate understanding of its meaning. This puts us in an 
epistemic situation worthy of Plato‟s Meno: can we ask after the meaning of being 
without presupposing that we do not already know it? Otherwise, how would the 
appropriateness of the response be measured? 
How will you look for it, Socrates, when you do not know at all what it 
is? How will you aim to search for something you do not know at all? If 
you should meet it, how will you know that this is the thing that you did 
not know? (Cooper and Hutchinson 880).  
 
As a seeking, the questioning needs prior guidance from what it seeks. 
The meaning of being must therefore already be available to us in a 
certain way … But already when we ask, „What is being [sic]‟?‟ we stand 
in an understanding of the „is‟ without being able to determine 
conceptually what the „is‟ means (Heidegger 5).  
 
It is not clear that Plato‟s answer to Meno‟s challenge is adequate, as he enters with his 
reply into “divine matters.” The paradox remains a formidable one. Heidegger too 
believes that we must already possess some understanding of the meaning of being in 
order even to inquire into what that meaning is. At the same time, what is the 
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significance of the qualification that yet we are unable to „determine conceptually what 
the „is‟ means‟?  
But at the same time, could not the opposite point be equally valid: that to search 
for anything, such as the meaning of being, indicates precisely that such an 
understanding is lacking? We find this argument in Plato‟s Symposium as regards the 
search for love: that desire presupposes that one is in need of what one desires. As 
Socrates queries, “…ask yourself whether it‟s necessary that this be so: a thing that 
desires desires something of which it is in need; otherwise, if it were not in need, it 
would not desire it” (Cooper and Hutchinson 482). By the same token, for the one that 
asks the question, is the meaning of being not something that is equally lacking an 
answer?  
If we put the two together, we find ourselves in the following dilemma: on the 
one hand we must already stand in an understanding relationship to that which we 
inquire after; on the other hand, in asking, that which we inquire after must nonetheless 
be absent to us in a significant way. How can both be true? Ultimately, Plato‟s answer, 
delving as it does into divine matters, is predicated on a fracturing of the world into 
appearance and reality. It delimits the scope of the dilemma to the epistemic limitations 
of the inquiring subject. In doing so, Plato‟s explanation must mediate between the 
reality of the meaning of being and the subjective experience of the inquiring subject 
who experiences the dilemma.  
Heidegger, like Plato, also seeks to answer the question. But what is particularly 
interesting about Heidegger‟s answer to the question is that whereas Plato‟s answer 
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entails certain epistemic and metaphysical significance, Heidegger‟s answer provides an 
interpretation of the kind of being that finds itself in this kind of epistemic situation, 
turning an epistemic question into an ontological one. He grounds the truth of the 
epistemic dilemma in the relationship between the meaning of being in general, and 
what it means to exist qua human being, or as he defines it in Being and Time—Dasein. 
As a result, his approach has consequence both for the meaning of being in general, and 
also for what it means to be a human being.  
The difference in Heidegger‟s approach cannot be understated, and constitutes a 
large part of the reason why he considers himself a departure from the tradition in 
western philosophy coming down from Plato. This departure, put plainly, is a departure 
from conceiving the meaning of being on the basis of objective presence. Instead of 
assuming that Dasein‟s epistemic dilemma is caused by a limited epistemic perspective, 
why not assume that the epistemic dilemma suggests something inherent to the very 
nature of the meaning of being? The fact that one already has an understanding of the 
meaning of being, and yet does not, is appropriated into the meaning of being itself.  
But to make the meaning of being a dilemma seems to deprive of it of a principle 
of stability upon which it is grounded. Is being therefore nothing? Or if it is something, 
but ungrounded, then it must be attached to some principle that explains a logical 
movement or development. And yet, as we have seen, the one horn of the dilemma 
already suggests that it belongs to Dasein to have an understanding of the meaning of 
being, albeit unclarified. What grounds this understanding? Where does this 
understanding of being derive from if not from the meaning of being itself? It is here that 
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Dasein steps into the forefront of the question of the meaning of being and the analytic 
that unfolds in Being and Time. If the being of Dasein can be clarified in the manner in 
which it moves already in an understanding of being, then it could be possible to free an 
answer to the understanding of being in general.  
We are looking for the answer to the question of the meaning of being in 
general, and above all the possibility of radically developing this basic 
question of all ontology. But freeing the horizon in which something like 
being in general becomes intelligible amounts to clarifying the possibility 
of the understanding of being in general, an understanding which itself 
belongs to the constitution of that being which we call Dasein. The 
understanding of being, however, cannot be radically clarified as an 
essential factor in the being of Dasein, unless the being to whose being it 
belongs has been primordially interpreted in itself with regard to its being 
(Heidegger 213-214).  
 
According to Heidegger, the question concerning the meaning of being must take a 
detour through the analytic of Dasein as its ground. But as a consequence for the central 
question of the text—the meaning of being—the detour through Dasein radically calls 
into question what kind of answer is possible. Depending on what grounds Dasein‟s 
understanding of being, this might delimit the possibility that a solution to the question 
of the meaning of being in general is possible. For Heidegger, the thought is that in 
trying to appropriate the dilemma into the ontology of Dasein, and grounding it there, 
the very thing he is after—the meaning of being—will precipitate out.  
The epistemic dilemma, therefore, is no longer a problem at all, but rather 
justified according to the human way of being, and ultimately the meaning of being 
itself. To be in this existential situation, according to Heidegger, is what it means to 
exist. But what in fact justifies Heidegger‟s approach to begin with? Why should 
philosophy be orientated towards an appropriation of the dilemma into an ontological 
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answer? Why not a cosmological answer like Plato‟s that accommodates the existence of 
the dilemma by explaining it in terms of a more encompassing reality? Under what 
prejudice is Heidegger formulating his position? Why should fundamental ontology take 
an existential turn through a primordial interpretation of Dasein?  
 
2.2. Justification of the approach  
 
In an essay entitled Indication of the Hermeneutical Situation from a course held in 
1922, Heidegger writes:  
All interpretations in the field of the history of philosophy, as well as in 
those other fields that strive—over against problem-historical 
„constructions‟—not to read anything into the texts, must admit that they 
too read into the texts, only they do so without orientation and with 
conceptual tools from the most disparate and uncontrollable sources 
(Figal 40).  
 
For Heidegger, questions such as what the meaning of being is do not take shape in a 
vacuum, but rather belong as objects of philosophical research to the history of 
philosophy in which they move and develop. It is no small coincidence that it is a line 
from Plato‟s Sophist on what the meaning of being is that introduces Being and Time, as 
it is out of and against this tradition that Heidegger‟s effort takes on its significance.  
Heidegger reminds us that all interpretations of the past „must admit that they too 
read into the texts‟—that they have a point of view that can be made transparent. In 
taking up the question of the meaning of being, Heidegger too moves within his point of 
view in interpreting the tradition and giving his contribution. We can make sense of the 
particular approach that Heidegger takes and the solutions that it leads him to by making 
transparent those principles that guide his effort. The two intertwined pillars of his 
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thought that lead him to the analytic of Dasein as the chosen path for fundamental 
ontology are phenomenology and hermeneutics. In appealing to both phenomenology 
and hermeneutics, Heidegger must be distinguished from his predecessors by his 
fundamentally distinctive appropriation of these traditions.  
 
2.3 Phenomenology  
 
To begin with, Heidegger‟s phenomenology must be distinguished from Husserl‟s. As 
Taylor Carman points out, “Common to Husserl and Heidegger, then, there is hardly a 
„principle‟ of phenomenology worthy of the name, apart from their shared commitment 
to a philosophical program of concrete description, as opposed to hypothesis and 
explanation” (Guignon 116). Both Husserl and Heidegger believe that philosophy begins 
from the description of how phenomena are actually experienced as the grounds of the 
validity of any conclusions. Heidegger, in discussing what phenomenology means in the 
introduction to Being and Time, even goes so far as to repeat Husserl‟s maxim, “To the 
things themselves!” (Heidegger 34). But what this means for Heidegger turns out to be 
something very different than what it means for Husserl.  
Husserl‟s phenomenology tries to give a rigorous descriptive means of 
understanding subjective experience for the sake of being able to ground objective 
claims about the world. Phenomenology, starting from the content of conscious 
experience, tries to turn a mirror to the structures of the intentional apprehension of the 
world so as to be able to ground scientific and philosophical inquiry on a transcendental 
foundation of how consciousness structures our experience. The route to objective 
knowledge necessarily must be derived from an understanding of the intentional content 
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of experience, not from the natural attitude that simply assumes the objectivity of 
empirical data and therefore the empirical sciences. When defining what a phenomenon 
is for Husserl, they are by their nature subjective appearances.  
Phenomena are, for Husserl, appearances, which is to say the contents of 
or in consciousness, not the things themselves appearing to 
consciousness. Phenomena are subjective, and phenomenology is 
essentially an inquiry into the nature of subjectivity in its own right, in 
strict distinction from the objective entities and structures studied by the 
empirical and formal sciences, in abstraction from our experience of them 
(Guignon 100).  
 
For Husserl, phenomenology, in direct inheritance of Kant‟s transcendental idealism, 
preserves the distinction between the appearance and the metaphysical reality. The 
„things themselves‟ that phenomenology investigates are the appearances that belong to 
consciousness. Phenomenology, as the investigation of consciousness and its intentional 
attitudes, carries the possibility for Husserl of making the structure of consciousness 
transparent, thereby illuminating the ground of all empirical claims. Towards this end, 
Husserl believes phenomenology to be a descriptive endeavor with an epistemically 
foundational intent.  
Heidegger, like Husserl, shares the starting impulse that philosophy must begin 
from the content of experience in the manner in which it is experienced. The principal 
difference will be that Heidegger, unlike Husserl, rejects the metaphysical assumption 
that the subjective and the objective are two distinct realities. For Heidegger, phenomena 
are not essentially subjective (Guignon 100). There is an interdependent relationship 
between how phenomena manifest in subjective experience and their reality. In classic 
appearance vs. reality metaphysics, there must be the distinction between the two or else 
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things as they are experienced will also be as they exist, collapsing semblance and truth 
into each other. For Heidegger, the category of a phenomenon replaces both the 
categories of appearance and reality and the aporia created by thinking in those opposed 
terms. Heidegger gives the following definition of a phenomenon:  
Manifestly it is something that does not show itself initially and for the 
most part, something that is concealed, in contrast to what initially and 
for the most part does show itself. But at the same time it is something 
that essentially belongs to what initially and for the most part shows 
itself, indeed in such a way that it constitutes its meaning and ground 
(Heidegger 35).  
 
In the concept of a phenomenon, we can see how the kernel of what belongs to the 
concepts of appearance and reality are both found together. There is what shows itself, 
which might be called the appearance, and what this showing conceals, which might be 
called the reality; however, what the showing conceals constitutes the meaning and 
ground of the showing, and yet this meaning and ground belongs to what shows itself. A 
difficult formulation to digest, one way to make sense of what a phenomenon is on 
Heidegger‟s account is through analogy to Aristotle. In the Nichomachean Ethics, we 
see that philosophic inquiry begins initially from the doxa, or common opinion. At the 
same time that the doxa form the basis for the analysis, they give way under 
philosophical investigation to a more essential formulation, which then becomes the 
basis of the truth of what was initially held in the opinion. The investigation proceeds on 
the basis of a deepening of the truth initially expressed in common opinion, but therefore 
never separate from those opinions that started the inquiry.  
Likewise, in Heidegger, the designation „phenomenon‟ captures both sides of the 
interdependent relationship between how the world is initially manifest in experience 
     13 
 
 
and the resulting analysis that uncovers the meaning and ground of what shows itself. 
This unfolds in Being and Time through Dasein‟s everyday understanding from which 
Heidegger derives the existentials that constitute the meaning and ground of what shows 
itself initially in an everyday way. But without the appropriate distinction between 
appearance and reality, the scope of such an inquiry is not simply about the content of 
consciousness, but is meaningfully inquiring into the meaning and ground of beings tout 
court. Phenomenology for Heidegger, therefore, constitutes ontology: “As far as content 
goes, phenomenology is the science of the being of beings—ontology” (Heidegger 33). 
The concealed aspect of what shows itself that constitutes its meaning and ground is 
nothing short of the being of its being—the subject matter of ontology.  
This creates a basis for understanding how a commitment to principles of a 
phenomenological investigation leads Heidegger to pursue the analytic of Dasein as the 
means of answering the question of the meaning of being. The phenomenon that shows 
itself initially is the fact that Dasein is in the epistemic situation of inquiring after the 
meaning of being yet already operating within an unclarified understanding of it. And 
every phenomenon shows itself as it is not and yet belongs to the showing. Both the 
having and the not possessing an understanding of being belong equally to the 
phenomenon as it shows itself. To take an explanation such as Plato offers with a two-
tier reality of appearance and reality, the phenomenon as it shows itself becomes 
divorced from the actual reality of being, and then only a hypothetical metaphysical 
solution can relate the two back to each other again. If the essence of a 
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phenomenological approach is to make philosophical explanations adequate to the 
phenomena as they show themselves, then Plato‟s solution will certainly not suffice.  
The closer we cleave to the phenomenon as it shows itself, the more 
phenomenologically adequate our inquiry becomes. In the introduction to Being and 
Time, Heidegger gives an explanation why this leads to Dasein becoming the focus of 
the inquiry into the meaning of being. In the first place, there is no such phenomenon as 
being itself that can be investigated: “Being is always the being of a being” (Heidegger 
7). This means that there are ever only particular beings at our disposal as phenomena, 
never being in general. Therefore, our inquiry can only ever proceed by starting from a 
particular being. Given the method of a phenomenological approach just outlined, we 
already have our first reason for choosing Dasein—the being of human beings—as our 
being to inquire about; that is, Dasein just so happens to be the being that inquires into 
the meaning of being. We cannot as of yet assume that in asking the question of the 
meaning of being, that the answer to the question will be separable from the being to 
which the question phenomenally belongs. In essence, in choosing Dasein, we have an 
extra fitting layer of phenomenological appropriateness because we are including into 
our inquiry the very being that asks the question about being. By further inquiring into 
the situation of this being, we are delving deeper into the initial phenomenon as it shows 
itself, rather than treating the question as if the answer can be sought out in abstraction 
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2.4 Hermeneutics  
 
If we wished to sum up Heidegger‟s phenomenology in a word, it is perhaps the oft-
repeated characterization that it is a „hermeneutic phenomenology‟. But as Jean Grondin 
points out, Heidegger‟s own occasional reference to hermeneutics in Being and Time 
offers little in the way of a robust understanding of his appropriation of that term.  
Yet, because Being and Time offered only meager remarks on this theme, 
it remained difficult to understand what Heidegger meant, exactly, by 
hermeneutics. Indeed, in Being and Time, a mere half-page at the end of 
Heidegger‟s otherwise elaborate Section 7 on phenomenology is devoted 
to situating and systematically defining hermeneutics as a philosophical 
program (Grondin 7).  
 
But despite the short shrift Heidegger gives the elucidation of hermeneutics, situated as 
it is in his elaboration of phenomenology, perhaps the insights that explain hermeneutics 
as a philosophical program are already present in germ in the discussion of 
phenomenology. If we return to the definition of a phenomenon, we see that for every 
phenomenon there is a hidden aspect that is concealed in the initial showing, but that is 
yet the ground of the showing, and so must be unconcealed. And yet by saying it is by its 
very nature concealed, we forgo the possibility of ever grasping it transparently, there 
being always an act of unconcealment that separates what is the ground of the 
phenomenon from us. And the initiative towards the unconcealment of phenomena 
Heidegger calls the „interpretation‟. Every phenomenon must be interpreted, and 
therefore the aim of phenomenology is in trying to interpret the phenomena such as to 
uncover their ground: “From the investigation itself we shall see that the methodological 
meaning of phenomenological description is interpretation” (Heidegger 33).  
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The notion that phenomenological description is interpretation is at the same time 
a disavowal that phenomenology is a purely descriptive endeavor. There is no 
transcendental position that achieves the transparency of phenomena—no claim to 
objective knowledge that can be reached. Heidegger situates Dasein caught in the middle 
of his definition of a phenomenon between what is showing itself and what is concealed 
that constitutes its meaning and ground. But this place is neither one of subjectivity nor 
of objectivity. What is bracketed is not something merely subjective, and what is derived 
is nothing purely objective.  
Drawing once again on our analogy to Aristotle, consider that the starting point 
of common opinion can neither be said to be true or false, although it certainly does not 
provide the best account. But if the subsequent analysis provides a better account, can 
the insights derived be evaluated for their truth separately from those initial appeals to 
common sense? What sense is there in entertaining the truth of the statement that the 
human good is eudaimonia independently of the common sense ethos that creates the 
background of its intelligibility? Likewise, in Heidegger, the starting point of Dasein‟s 
everydayness will not be separable from the more primordial existentials that will be 
derived such as angst, death, guilt, conscience.  
But if phenomenological description is interpretation, Heidegger perhaps makes 
a claim with stronger emphasis a few lines later when he writes that “Phenomenology of 
Dasein is hermeneutics in the original signification of that word, which designates the 
work of interpretation” (Heidegger 33). To a certain extent we can only speculate what 
the „original signification‟ of hermeneutics is meant to refer to exactly. But Heidegger 
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goes on to write that the hermeneutic of Dasein will provide both “…the condition of the 
possibility of every ontological investigation,” as well as “…the roots of what can be 
called „hermeneutics‟ only in a derivative sense: the methodology of the historical 
humanistic disciplines” (Heidegger 33). If we take a step in the direction of a 
phenomenology of Dasein we can begin to understand the further significance it might 
have over and above other objects for investigation that lends credence to its designation 
as an original hermeneutics.  
Our first observation in a phenomenology of Dasein was that Dasein asks the 
question of the meaning of being. Our second observation was that Dasein already 
understands something of being. This capacity for understanding is itself an important 
ontological claim of the phenomenological description of Dasein. Because the nature of 
phenomenological description is not simply epistemic, but fundamentally the work of 
ontology, defining the being of Dasein as understanding means that it is interpretive and 
therefore ontological in its very nature: “Understanding of being is itself a determination 
of being of Dasein. The ontic distinction of Dasein lies in the fact that it is ontological” 
(Heidegger 10). To be ontological means both to relate to phenomena in terms of the 
category of being—i.e. to say of anything that it „is‟—and also to say of oneself in what 
way one „is‟.  
When Dasein understands phenomena other than itself, it can still make a partial 
foundational claim for the direction of the interpretation because the unconcealment 
belongs to how the phenomena initially show themselves through a pre-reflective 
engagement. The basis of this understanding, as is elaborated in the notion of being-in-
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the-world, will be Dasein‟s practical life. But how does this stand when the 
phenomenological inquiry becomes reflexive, when Dasein engages in an interpretation 
of its own being? How does the phenomenon initially show itself? What guides the 
inquiry?  
In order to understand the being that understands, the reflexivity of the task 
cannot direct the inquiry back onto any phenomenal basis. Dasein cannot wait for its 
being to show itself in order to be unconcealed, because it is its own activity of 
unconcealment that constitutes the showing of its being as an understanding being. It is 
not the various pre-reflective activities that Dasein engages in that form the basis of a 
phenomenological investigation into its being, but rather the understanding that makes 
sense of those activities. To provide an example, whereas the basis of our understanding 
of a hammer is pre-reflectively grounded in its usefulness for hammering, a similar 
understanding of Dasein engaged in hammering cannot equally be said to be grounded in 
its activity of hammering. Rather, one must look to the understanding that guides 
hammering—e.g. that of building a home—in order to understand what the being of 
Dasein is about. Therefore, an understanding of the being of Dasein has no other basis 
than its own understanding.  
Thus it is constitutive of the being of Dasein to have, in its very being, a 
relation of being to this being. And this in turn means that Dasein 
understands itself in its being in some way and with some explicitness. It 
is proper to this being that it be disclosed to itself with and through its 
being (Heidegger 10).  
 
The being of Dasein is determined in and through its understanding. And because the 
phenomenological investigation thrusts the inquiry onto Dasein‟s understanding, this 
     19 
 
 
puts Dasein in a position of some transparency in understanding its being. Dasein 
„understands itself in its being in some way and with some explicitness‟.  
But this transparency is not at the same time an understanding of the meaning of 
its being. Heidegger writes, “To be ontological does not yet mean to develop ontology. 
Thus if we reserve the term ontology for the explicit, theoretical question of the meaning 
of beings, the intended ontological character of Dasein is to be designated as pre-
ontological” (Heidegger 10). As a question, the meaning of being is a kind of 
interpretation that belongs to ontology, or the theory of being, which still requires that 
Dasein engages in a phenomenological description of understanding, the same as with 
the investigation of any other phenomenon.  
Nevertheless, this creates a special opportunity in choosing Dasein as the being 
to investigate in the question concerning the meaning of being. For every other being 
unlike Dasein, if it were to be chosen as the subject of the inquiry into the meaning of 
being, there would be a myriad of ways of unconcealing its being. A tree, for example, 
can be interpreted in terms of its biology, its aesthetics, its utility, or its divinity, to name 
a few possibilities. These all represent different ontic ways of understanding what the 
being of the tree consists in. But which one of these many ways sufficiently gets at the 
meaning of the tree? If the proper ontological perspective is not secured in our analysis, 
the results for the meaning of being would not be sufficiently ontologically grounded. 
Therefore, with any other being unlike Dasein, we have the problem then of how to 
ensure that the analysis is ontological.  
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However, with Dasein the same problem does not exist. The fact that Dasein‟s 
ontic distinction is that it is ontological—that its being is disclosed in its 
understanding—means that the meaning of its being can never be identified with 
whatever understanding of itself it has achieved, because then the meaning of its being 
would change according with the development or decay of its understanding.  
 
Not only does an understanding of being belong to Dasein, but this 
understanding also develops or decays according to the actual manner of 
being of Dasein at any given time; for this reason it has a wealth of 
interpretations at its disposal (Heidegger 14).  
 
At the same time that no interpretation can validly be based on the specific content of its 
self-understanding, this also implies that the meaning of its being must show itself 
somehow through every self-understanding. This has the effect of pushing the 
investigation of its being into the structure of its understanding rather than what the 
understanding consists in. And because such an investigation does not need to secure a 
specific understanding in order to be ontological, a sound basis for an investigation 
concerning the meaning of its being is available to it at all times. Therefore, the principal 
reason to choose Dasein on the basis of its original hermeneutic quality is the fact that 
we are not faced with the problem of knowing whether the basis for our understanding is 
ontological and not simply ontic.  
This understanding relationship to its being that defines Dasein perhaps explains 
why phenomenology of Dasein is hermeneutics „in the original signification of that 
word‟. Because phenomenology of Dasein is the interpretation of understanding, it is not 
phenomenal in its orientation---at its basis is Dasein‟s understanding, which itself 
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changes with Dasein. And as we shall see in our formal exegesis of interpretation, the 
relationship of interpretation to understanding is such that interpretation is “…the 
development of possibilities projected in understanding” (Heidegger 139). Therefore, the 
motive force which explains the changing basis and development of understanding is 
internal to it. Phenomenology of Dasein becomes the continual development of 
understanding, its direction not determined from below by a phenomenal basis, but 
rather pulled along from above by interpretation.  
This reciprocity between understanding and interpretation is often characterized 
as the hermeneutic circle. The point for Heidegger, of course, “…is not to get out of the 
circle, but to get in it in the right way” (Heidegger 143). For Heidegger, a circle in 
understanding explains how it is that Dasein can find itself in between having yet 
seeking an understanding of the meaning of being. Understanding becomes the basis for 
interpretation, which develops understanding, sowing the ground for new interpretation, 
ad infinitum. But more than simply applying to the question of the meaning of being, this 
model becomes the basis for how Dasein understands being from the most basic 
everyday coping in the world, the most basic acknowledgement that “the sky is blue,” all 
the way to the more highly specialized ways of knowing expressed in the sciences. In 
articulating this most primordial structure of how Dasein as ontological knows being, the 
significance of the phenomenology of Dasein rightfully becomes an investigation into 
the condition of the possibility of every ontological investigation.  
Hermeneutics as a philosophical discipline gained ground before Heidegger as 
the attempt to articulate a methodology appropriate to the human sciences. For example, 
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what kind of method is appropriate for grounding historical claims as opposed to the 
claims of the natural sciences? As such, philosophical hermeneutics in its nascent form 
had an entirely epistemological purview. In Being and Time we see many of those 
insights such as the fore-structure of understanding incorporated to elaborate Dasein‟s 
situatedness in the hermeneutic circle. But taken together with the insight that 
phenomenological description is ontology, the crucial difference that separates 
Heidegger‟s appropriation of hermeneutics from that of his predecessors is that 
hermeneutics under Heidegger becomes ontological. In divesting understanding of its 
purely epistemic character, Dasein invariably becomes the center for the unconcealment 
of being.  
 
2.5 Conclusion to justification of the approach  
 
The scope of the discussion here of phenomenology and hermeneutics as they factor into 
the project of Being and Time was limited from the start by the question of what justifies 
answering the question of the meaning of being through an ontological investigation of 
Dasein. Heidegger offers a summation of the reasons why Dasein takes priority.  
Dasein accordingly takes priority in several ways over all other beings. 
The first priority is an ontic one: this being is defined in its being by 
existence. The second priority is an ontological one: on the basis of its 
determination as existence Dasein is in itself „ontological.‟ But just as 
originally Dasein possesses—in a manner constitutive of its 
understanding of existence—an understanding of the being of all beings 
unlike itself. Dasein therefore has its third priority as the ontic-ontological 
condition of the possibility of all ontologies. Dasein has proven to be 
what, before all other beings, is ontologically the primary being to be 
interrogated (Heidegger 11).  
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All these reasons have variously been produced in our analysis. First, following 
Heidegger‟s phenomenological methodology, because being itself is not available as a 
subject for analysis, the investigation must be proceed from a particular being, and all 
the more appropriate then to choose the being that just so happens to pose the question: 
“Thus to work out the question of being means to make a being—one who questions—
transparent in its being” (Heidegger 6). The ontic priority and the ontological are really 
the same reason approached from two different directions, as Dasein‟s ontic distinction 
is that it is ontological. The premise from which Being and Time begins—that “The 
„essence‟ of Dasein lies in its existence”—makes sense only as an ontological claim 
derived by combining: the notion that phenomenological description is both ontology 
and interpretation; and, the initial phenomenological description of Dasein as a being 
that understands and questions being (Heidegger 40). Taken together with its reflexive 
implications for self-understanding, only then does it become apparent that “The 
„essence‟ of this being lies in its to be” (Heidegger 39). The ontological priority that 
Dasein is disclosive of being is merely a repetition of the insights that prop up the ontic 
priority to begin with. Finally, the ontic-ontological priority is a necessary consequence 
of the fact that the being of Dasein is ontological. If ontology is possible only through 
Dasein, then the meaning of any being can only be determined through Dasein as the 
inquiring agent; therefore, certainly it makes most sense to interrogate the being through 
which such meaning can be determined. Otherwise, the meaning of a being other than 
Dasein will always be somehow relative to Dasein as the inquiring agent, and the 
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analysis will never achieve the necessary transcendental point of view to reach the 
meaning of being in general.  
Although the hermeneutic insights play a critical role in the elaboration of what it 
means for Dasein to be an understanding being, all of the reasons why Dasein takes 
priority can be unpacked from the phenomenological claims, and perhaps even more 
reducibly, simply the definition of a phenomenon. Phenomenology becomes ontology 
because a phenomenon recognizes no distinction between subjective and objective; 
phenomenology becomes interpretive because a phenomenon has a concealed ground 
that belongs to how the phenomenon shows itself. But a phenomenon is itself a non-
entity without positing a being that has the experience of it. Therefore, Dasein is lurking 
in the background even in the definition of a phenomenon. And if one reflexively applies 
those insights belonging to a phenomenon to the being that is invariably situated in the 
understanding experience of them, the consequences that make Dasein a priority in the 
question concerning the meaning of being naturally unfold.  
 
2.6 Authenticity  
 
Of all the reasons that make Dasein a priority in the question concerning the meaning of 
being, the one that gives the inquiry a secure basis is that fact that because Dasein‟s ontic 
distinction is that it is ontological, it will both be the case that no particular ontic 
disclosure will be adequate to define the meaning of its being, while also being the case 
that any ontic disclosure will be an equally adequate basis for inquiring into the meaning 
of its being. Any disclosure of its being is a testament to its being ontological in its 
being; but therefore, the analysis cannot stop at any particular disclosure, but must find a 
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way to capture Dasein in its being as understanding being. This means we already 
possess a good indication of what an ontological analysis of Dasein will produce. An 
ontological analysis of Dasein must present an understanding of Dasein that is not 
reducible to the results of any ontic investigation, but rather transcends them. The 
meaning of Dasein must manifest the transcendent structure of self-understanding and 
not be reducible to any one ontic disclosure.  
However, to be clear, this does not mean that all ontic beginnings will be equally 
productive for the sake of the analytic: “The possibility of understanding the being of 
this being stands and falls with the secure accomplishment of the correct presentation of 
this being” (Heidegger 41). If the goal of an ontological analysis is to capture the 
existentials that pertain to Dasein‟s being in general, then it is little wonder that 
Heidegger chooses Dasein‟s average everydayness as the starting point for the 
investigation into its being.  
And although the fact that Dasein is ontological creates a special opportunity for 
choosing Dasein as the being to investigate into the meaning of being, it also creates a 
unique liability for Dasein to fulfill in this regards. In the first place, we must recognize 
that nothing has yet been proven. The relatively radical phenomenological suggestion 
that Dasein is ontological in its being has not been proven. Nor is it sufficient that an 
ontological analysis could prove by means of a transcendental deduction from the fact 
that Dasein understands itself in many ways that it is ontological by virtue of this, and 
not simply lacking in self-understanding (i.e. epistemically deficient in regards to its 
being). The standard of proof must be higher, and much hinges on this. If the meaning of 
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being in general is to be based on the meaning of the being of Dasein, it is essential that 
the analytic of Dasein finds the proper attestation of its truth.  
But what kind of proof is appropriate? The transcendental deduction is 
insufficient as a manner of proof because it does nothing to dissuade us from the 
alternate Platonic explanation that Dasein has its being in the manner of objective 
presence, but it lacks appropriate knowledge about it. But the fact that Dasein is 
ontological creates its own burden of proof. As part of what it means to be ontological, 
the development of Dasein‟s understanding occurs according to a motive force internal 
to it as opposed to a principle external to it. This seems necessary if Dasein is truly to be 
ontological in its being—change must come from within. If this is true, there will be 
identifiable in Dasein‟s existence the existentiell possibility that captures the moment 
when Dasein transcends its self-understanding. This possibility will be the attestation of 
the fact that Dasein‟s being is in fact ontological. This possibility Heidegger will call 
Dasein‟s authenticity. By showing how it is possible that Dasein can be authentic, 
Heidegger wishes to give credence to the phenomenological description of Dasein and 
the direction he takes to provide an answer to the meaning of being.  
But the nature of the proof is limited by the fact that because Dasein‟s being 
transcends whatever is disclosed in its self-understanding, what constitutes an authentic 
possibility for its being can never be grounded within the ontic framework of a particular 
disclosure. Because Dasein is ontological, what it means to be this being is pushed away 
from definite ways in which it has its being into the structure of its self-understanding. 
As a result, the being of Dasein is identified with certain existentials rather than 
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existentiells. Of course, existence itself takes place only in terms of definite existentiell 
possibilities. Authenticity, too, is an existentiell possibility. But it is impossible for the 
proof to provide a description of a concrete existentiell way Dasein has its being in order 
to show what it means to be authentic, it can only outline the existential conditions of its 
happening. Heidegger‟s „proof‟ is more in showing the coherence of his thinking 




As the analysis of authenticity moves forward, two important conclusions from the 
previous discussion should be kept in mind. The first is the definition of authenticity that 
was gained as it stands relative to the project. Authenticity turns out to be the possibility 
that Dasein can show in an existentiell manifestation that it is ontological in its very 
being. Authenticity is a kind of proof that serves an ontological function, separate from 
the normal normative connotations that perhaps the notion of what it means to be 
'authentic' normally carries. With the ontological function that defines authenticity 
always in mind, it will be easier to navigate the various descriptive characterizations of 
authenticity that Heidegger uses throughout Being and Time that subsequently become 
the focus of the inquiry in the following chapters into clarifying the meaning of 
authenticity. 
But if Heidegger is correct in that the meaning of the being of Dasein has a self-
transcendent structure, the second important conclusion will be that it is impossible to 
identify what it means to be authentic by fixing it relative to any concrete existentiell 
possibility for being. Although authenticity is supposed to be an existentiell 
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manifestation of the meaning of Dasein's being, this nonetheless cannot point to any one 
way of being in the world. That is because transcendence cannot be brought to objective 
presence. This effectively limits the nature of the proof and the existentiell manifestation 
to simply grounding the possibility of an existentiell attestation of authenticity. This 
removes the discussion of authenticity as an existential possibility from the concrete 
conditions of its happening. This becomes relevant especially for the discussion of 
being-toward-death upon which the existential possibility of an existentiell attestation is 
grounded. It is there that whether or not Heidegger is presenting a possible existentiell 
guideline for becoming authentic through an anticipation of dying becomes a central 
question for clarifying the meaning of authenticity. 
     29 
 
 




The definition of authenticity gained in Chapter II was the existentiell possibility that 
Dasein can manifest the transcendent structure of self-understanding implied by its 
ontological constitution. Whether such a possibility can be demonstrated is important for 
confirming the phenomenological description of Dasein and ultimately the answer to the 
question of the meaning of being. This definition was gained by situating the meaning of 
authenticity within the project as a whole. Curiously enough, why authenticity is 
important for the project is not something that Heidegger himself offers an account of at 
all in Being and Time. The introduction, which was written after the completion of the 
main text, offers a clarification of the aim of the project, including why Dasein takes 
priority in the question of the meaning of being, but fails to mention authenticity at all.  
Heidegger formally introduces authenticity in the opening pages of division I, 
Chapter I. There, Heidegger simply tells us that two kinds of being belong to Dasein—
authenticity and inauthenticity—and that “…these expressions are terminologically 
chosen in the strictest sense of the word…” (SZ, 40). The German word Heidegger uses 
which is translated as authenticity is eigenlichkeit, which has a literal meaning of what is 
one‟s own, or what is proper to one‟s self. Eigen means “own” or “proper.” Adding –lich 
turns it into the noun form “owness” or what is translated in Being and Time as 
“authentic.” Adding -keit modifies it into “authenticness” or what is rendered in the text 
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as “authenticity.” Heidegger tells us to take the use of “authenticity” in the strictest sense 
of its meaning. This means a possibility that Dasein can be its own, or “…belong to 
itself…” (Heidegger 40).  
Because the meaning of authenticity is not situated in the project as a whole, it is 
perhaps little wonder then that so much disparity occurs between commentators on 
Being and Time on what it means exactly to be authentic. What it means to belong to 
one‟s self is in need of further clarification. And throughout Being and Time there are 
defining statements that give us an indication of what qualifies an authentic possibility 
for being leading up to anticipatory resoluteness in division II. Taken together, these 
statements lend to the interpretation of authenticity strong subjectivistic-individualistic 
qualities.  
The first of these statements is found at the very beginning of Being and Time, 
where along with the priority of existence over essence, Dasein has “the character of 
always-being-my-own-being [Jemeinigkeit]” as one of two founding characteristics of 
Dasein (Heidegger 40). And furthermore, that “The two kinds of being of authenticity 
and inauthenticity… are based on the fact that Dasein is in general determined by always 
being-mine” (Heidegger 40). So, initially, authenticity as a possibility is grounded in a 
self-referential property that belongs to Dasein. This seems to suggest that there are 
many Dasein, that we are each are own Dasein, and that authenticity/inauthenticity 
belongs personally to each of our own realms of possibilities.  
The second indication that authenticity has strong subjectivistic-individualistic 
qualities is the many statements describing inauthenticity in division I, and what they 
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conversely imply about authenticity. In division I, Heidegger‟s focus is mainly to 
describe inauthentic Dasein, also referred to as Dasein‟s average everydayness. In these 
descriptions, inauthenticity is identified with being lost in an anonymous social 
normativity called the they (das man): “The self of everyday Dasein is the they-self 
which we distinguish from the authentic self, the self which has explicitly grasped itself. 
As the they-self, Dasein is dispersed in the they and must first find itself” (Heidegger 
121). In the difference between authenticity and inauthenticity, Heidegger establishes the 
dichotomy between the self-ownership that characterizes authenticity and the dissolution 
in Dasein‟s relationships with others that characterizes inauthenticity. Inauthenticity is a 
kind of lost absorption in the expectations for being a self that speak to us from out of 
our relationships with others. “Inauthenticity… constitutes precisely a distinctive kind of 
being-in-the-world which is completely taken in by the world and the Mitdasein of the 
others in the they” (Heidegger 164).  
It is not until division II that Heidegger begins to outline the positive constitution 
of an authentic Dasein. From division I we have the one positive criterion that authentic 
Dasein is “…the self which has explicitly grasped itself” (Heidegger 121). Division II 
starts by declaring that “The inadequacy of the hermeneutical situation from which the 
foregoing analysis originated must be overcome” (Heidegger 219). That is due to the 
fact that the scope of division I was limited to an analysis of Dasein in its inauthentic 
mode—its average everydayness. But in order to fulfill the intention of the project, the 
attestation of an authentic possibility for being must be established: “We are looking for 
an authentic potentiality-of-being of Dasein that is attested by Dasein itself in its 
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existentiell possibility” (Heidegger 247). In order to do this, first Heidegger establishes 
the grounds for the ontological possibility of authenticity in the discussion of 
anticipation, or being-toward-death. Authenticity is possible through death as one‟s 
ownmost possibility, and through being-toward-death Dasein has the opportunity to take 
a stance on existence that is its own.  
Anticipation lets Dasein understand that it has to take over solely from 
itself the potentiality-of-being in which it is concerned absolutely about 
its ownmost being. Death does not just „belong‟ in an undifferentiated 
way to one‟s own Dasein, but it lays claim on it as something individual. 
The nonrelational character of death understood in anticipation 
individualizes Dasein down to itself. This individualizing is a way in 
which the „there‟ is disclosed for existence. It reveals the fact that any 
being-together-with what is taken care of and any being-with the others 
fails when one‟s ownmost potentiality-of-being is at stake. Dasein can 
authentically be itself only when it makes that possible of its own accord 
(Heidegger 243).  
 
This paragraph, along with the rest of division II, Chapter I, carries some of the strongest 
subjectivistic-individualistic language in Being and Time. Here we see that anticipation 
of death „individualizes Dasein to itself,‟ and even more importantly perhaps, Dasein‟s 
relationships to others fail to provide a basis for Dasein‟s authentic possibility to be 
itself.  
Between mineness, the characterization of inauthenticity, and the positive 
ontological characterization of authenticity as anticipation, we have a strong implication 
in Being and Time of authenticity‟s subjectivistic-individualistic qualities. Being-with 
others also has its authentic possibilities, but Heidegger goes so far as to say that these 
possibilities are predicated on first authentically being a self. He writes, “It is from the 
authentic being a self of resoluteness that authentic being-with-one-another first 
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arises…” (Heidegger 274). This lends the impression that the primordial meaning of 
authenticity is a unique possibility for the individual, and only derivatively can being-
with others be authentic when such authentic individuals join together.  
 
3.2 Two challenges  
 
But in light of some of the other statements that Heidegger makes in Being and Time, 
there is a challenge in understanding how these subjectivistic-individualistic qualities 
cohere with other parts of the text, especially Dasein‟s relationship to other Dasein. At 
the end of Being and Time, in his discussion on historicity, Heidegger writes:  
But if fateful Dasein essentially exists as being-in-the-world in being-with 
others, its occurrence is an occurrence-with and is determined as 
destiny… The fateful destiny of Dasein in and with its „generation‟ 
constitutes the complete, authentic occurrence of Dasein” (Heidegger 
352).  
 
This passage suggests that a particular kind of relationship to other Dasein—a fateful 
destiny—is in some way constitutive of a „complete‟ understanding of authenticity. But 
up until this point in division II, authenticity, with its subjectivistic-individualistic 
connotations, only seems to draw upon those existential structures that belong to being-
in-the-world, especially Dasein‟s being-toward-death. The other Dasein, insofar as they 
are even mentioned, are mainly brought up in terms of the anonymous they that is 
associated with inauthenticity. The limited mention of authentic being-with others, one 
in which for example Dasein can “leap ahead” of another Dasein in order to free it for its 
possibilities, can still be understood on the basis of a subjectivistic-individualistic 
account of what it means to be authentic (Heidegger 115). The problem with what 
Heidegger seems to imply with Dasein‟s „fateful destiny‟ with its generation is that there 
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is little indication in anticipatory resoluteness that in what it means to be authentic, 
Dasein is implicated together with all the other Dasein of its generation such that its 
authenticity hangs together with theirs.  
At the same time, this is not completely unanticipated. It reminds us of Dasein‟s 
essential constitution as presented in division I, Chapter IV, that being-in-the-world is 
equiprimordial with being-with others. There, Heidegger writes, “By investigating in the 
direction of the phenomenon which allows us to answer the question of the who, we are 
led to structures of Dasein which are equiprimordial with being-in-the-world: being-with 
and the Mitdasein” (Heidegger 107). Because being-in-the-world and being-with others 
are equiprimordial phenomena, this seems to provide a basis for the belief that a 
complete understanding of Dasein‟s authenticity includes its being-with others in some 
constitutive way. And although it is an underdeveloped theme for much of Being and 
Time, there seems to be an existential understanding that comes out of Dasein‟s being-
with-others that then gives social-historical dimensions to authenticity at the end of 
division II that cannot be accounted for by the subjectivistic-individualistic structures 
that are at the forefront of Heidegger‟s explanation of authenticity.  
There is second challenge to our understanding of authenticity and the 
subjectivistic-individualistic qualities that seem to define it. This challenge concerns 
how Heidegger describes the way in which inauthentic Dasein constitutes our everyday 
existence. Heidegger is clear that Dasein, for the most part, remains inauthentic:  
“Initially, „I‟ „am‟ not in the sense of my own self, but I am the others in the mode of the 
they. In terms of the they, and as the they, I am initially „given‟ to „myself‟. Initially, 
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Dasein is the they and for the most part it remains so” (Heidegger 121). To say that 
Dasein is „initially‟ inauthentic is not to suggest that later on it is less so, but rather that 
Dasein, in its factical situation, is always for the most part inauthentic. Heidegger tells us 
that the reason that this is so has to do with how the they dominates interpretation, 
including Dasein‟s self-interpretation: "...Dasein, which mostly remains concealed from 
itself in its authenticity on account of the public way of being interpreted of the they… " 
(Heidegger 178).  
Interpretation, which is the development of Dasein‟s possibilities, is the key 
existential for determining Dasein‟s possibilities, and therefore, its authentic or 
inauthentic development. Since the they initially determines the different ways of 
interpretation that Dasein is introduced to in being-with others, this prevents Dasein 
from projecting itself onto its own authentic possibilities for being a self. Furthermore, 
Heidegger writes that “Dasein can never escape the everyday way of being interpreted 
into which Dasein has grown initially. All genuine understanding, interpreting and 
communication, rediscovery and new appropriation come about in it and out of it and 
against it” (Heidegger 159). The fact that Dasein can never escape the everyday way of 
interpreting its existence creates a point of tension for a subjectivistic-individualistic 
understanding of authenticity. How is Dasein supposed to realize any individualized 
possibilities for being a self when its very ability to develop those possibilities is 
conditioned by the dominance that the they has over interpretation?  
So, in the first place, an overly subjective-individualistic emphasis for 
understanding authenticity has a difficulty in incorporating the social-historical claim 
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that authenticity could have something like a generational context to it; and in the 
second, the way in which interpretation is conditioned by inauthentic structures seems to 
conflict with the expectation that authenticity individualizes Dasein in any robust 
fashion. Perhaps then, in our attempt to make sense of what it means for authentic 
Dasein to belong to itself, it is insufficient or incomplete to only emphasize those 
subjectivistic-individualistic qualities that are at the forefront of the explanation in the 
text. In the very least, those qualities are not in themselves self-explanatory, but are in 
need of further clarification. To be sure, we have not yet even begun to ask the question 
of what such descriptions of authenticity can mean independent of a commonsense 
intuition about them. But from Heidegger we lack the appropriate clarifying remarks that 
would allow us to place these claims in proper perspective. What is needed is a way of 
binding the scope of what authenticity can and cannot mean in a way that is more 
rigorous than what the various descriptions themselves leave open to interpretation. It is 
therefore necessary to ground our understanding of authenticity somehow on a textual 
basis.  
But we are not completely without a direction in this endeavor. Because 
Heidegger offers us a fairly comprehensive ontological analysis of Dasein, it is possible 
to limit the scope of the interpretation of what authenticity can mean within those 
existential structures that explain how Dasein is in the world in general. Unlike a 
metaphysically grounded understanding of the being of human being, Heidegger tells us 
from the start that Dasein is being-in-the-world and that all of its existential features can 
be derived from that context: “Dasein is its disclosure” (Heidegger 125). Therefore, a 
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certain transparency is possible through an analysis of the way in which Dasein is its 
disclosure that can provide appropriate insight into the clarification of Dasein‟s 
authenticity.  
It is in division I that Heidegger lays the groundwork for what it means to exist 
qua Dasein. The sections that are particularly illuminating in this regards are those that 
describe what the being-in of being-in-the-world means. In division I, Chapter V, 
Heidegger discusses being-in as such under the rubric of “The Existential Constitution of 
the There.” What is covered in these sections concerns the existential structures of 
Dasein‟s existentiell existence, providing insight into how is it that Dasein is “there” in 
the world.  
For an understanding of authenticity this can be relevant because authenticity is 
an existentiell possibility. And since “The Existential Constitution of the There” 
provides the existentials of every existentiell being-in, authentic or inauthentic, what 
limits our understanding of what it means to be in the world will equally narrow the 
scope of understanding authentic or inauthentic being-in-the-world as well. The 
descriptive qualities identified with authentic and inauthentic Dasein will then have a 
basis in the transparency of the existential structures that delineate Dasein‟s existentiell 
existence.  
What we are interested in when we inquire into the being-in, or the “Da” of “Da-
sein,” has three existential parts that phenomenally account for the way in which Dasein 
is in the world: attunement, understanding, and discourse. Being-in reveals itself 
phenomenally through Dasein's attunement and understanding, both of which are “… 
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equiprimordially determined by discourse” (Heidegger 126). For our purposes, what will 
be most relevant of these three existentials is understanding, its possible development in 
interpretation, and the discourse that determines it.  
 
3.3 Understanding  
 
The existential of understanding was first introduced in an informal way as the fact that 
it belongs to Dasein to understand something of being. This was developed further into 
an ontological statement with the deeper implication that understanding is not simply 
epistemic, but has ontological significance as the disclosure of being. In the discussion 
of how Dasein is there in the world, understanding is given formal elaboration in this 
fundamental role of constituting Dasein in terms of its possibilities for being a self.  
In understanding as an existential, the thing we are able to do is not a 
what, but being as existing. The mode of being of Dasein as a potentiality 
of being lies existentially in understanding. Dasein is not something 
objectively present which then has as an addition the ability to do 
something, but is rather primarily being-possible. Dasein is always what 
it can be and how it is its possibility (Heidegger 134).  
 
How Dasein understands itself equates to how it has disclosed its being. This is neither 
an abstract theorizing of its possibilities to be or not to be itself, nor is it necessary that 
Dasein has conceptually grasped its possibilities at all. As Jean Grondin explains, “This 
everyday understanding, Heidegger observes, almost always remains implicit. As a 
„mode of being‟ it is not consciously thematized. We live too much within it for it to 
need to be made explicit” (Grondin 94). In understanding, Dasein simply knows what to 
do in the world. One understands that the door is for opening, that the bus will take one 
downtown, or that the paper will provide the latest news. This kind of understanding, 
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embedded in Dasein‟s everyday coping, is the basic building blocks of the disclosure of 
self and world that is constitutive of being-in-the-world. What Dasein understands, 
initially and for the most part, are not statements about the world, but rather its 
possibilities for being in the world.  
Behind the existential of understanding is the essential aspect of Dasein‟s being 
that it “exists” rather than it “is.” Contrary to what is the case of an innerworldly being, 
Dasein cannot be defined according to objectively present qualities—to do so would 
make use of category distinctions that belong to a metaphysic of presence. For 
Heidegger, the Aristotelian categories are inappropriate to define existence: “Beings are 
a who (existence) or else a what (objective presence in the broadest sense)” (Heidegger 
42). Dasein is a who in this regards, and therefore the “what” of its being is disclosed in 
active predicates of “be-ing” instead of passive ones of substantiality. That is why the 
analytic of Dasein proceeds according to existentials, not categories. Understanding, 
along with the rest of the existentials, carries this connotation of an engaged present 
activity in defining the structure of Dasein‟s being-in-the-world.  
Since understanding is not epistemic, but disclosive of being, what it produces is 
not propositions but rather possible ways of existing concretely in the world. And the 
fact that understanding is parsed out in terms of possibility has significance on both the 
existentiell and the existential level of Dasein‟s existence. The first of these reflects the 
fact that Dasein “…has always already got itself into definite possibilities. As a 
potentiality for being which it is, it has let some go by; it constantly adopts the 
possibilities of its being, grasps them, and goes astray” (Heidegger 135). As it moves 
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through life, possibilities for being are chosen, adopted, rejected, seized upon, and these 
constitute the defining content of Dasein‟s existentiell, factical existence. As an existing 
being, Dasein is already in definite possibilities for being.  
However, if Dasein were nothing more than its concrete existentiell possibilities 
in any given situation, either its essence would be fixed to those possibilities, or any 
change it experienced in its possibilities would not originate of its own being, but would 
have to be a result of an external motive force. But what we are looking for is an 
attestation of the deeper existential essence of its being, confirmed by one of the initial 
statements of Being and Time, that “…Dasein is always essentially its possibility” 
(Heidegger 40). This is to be read literally: its possibility, not its various possibilities. 
The fact that Dasein is its possibility is the necessary condition for the fact that it can 
transition through various existentiell possibilities and is not defined essentially through 
any of them. The deeper existential truth that allows for Dasein to be its possibilities 
existentielly is the fact that Dasein is its possibility existentially. Disclosure in terms of 
possibility attests to Dasein‟s existential essence as potentiality. But concretely, as it is 
manifest in its disclosure, Dasein is always situated in definite possibilities existentielly. 
It never finds itself hovering above its possibilities like a free-floating ego.  
In terms of the project of making sense of authenticity, the fact that Dasein is its 
possibility existentially is what Heidegger is looking for an existentiell attestation of. 
Otherwise, Dasein‟s existence could be anchored to some arche that determines the way 
in which it transitions through various existentiell possibilities, and Heidegger could not 
rightful claim that he his manifested his starting hypothesis that Dasein‟s essence is in 
     41 
 
 
fact existence. But if authenticity is the task of bringing an existentiell attestation of the 
truth of existence, then the fact that Dasein is always situated existentielly could make 
the project of authenticity problematic, because situated as it is always within existentiell 
disclosures of its being, its existential essence can never directly be foregrounded in an 
existentiell disclosure. To do so would mean to find the Archimedean point relative to 
the disclosure of existence in order to gain an objective grasp on it.  
And yet, this difficulty is averted if we reflect on the ontological implication of 
the fact that possibility, not actuality, is what is disclosed in Dasein‟s understanding. 
What is possible is never necessary, and therefore never was. The worry that Dasein can 
never foreground its existential essence in an existentiell disclosure mistakenly attributes 
to Dasein‟s possibilities the quality of objective presence. The definite possibilities that 
constitute Dasein‟s disclosure are only definite in the sense that they are the ones that 
Dasein has gotten itself into, they are not definite in the sense of being substantial. The 
ground upon which possibilities are disclosed is not substantial being, but Dasein in the 
mode understanding being.  
Therefore, when one looks to the heart of what it means to be a possibility—what 
constitutes the ground of its meaning—one finds the understanding being of Dasein that 
is holding up what is possible about its possibilities. This corroborates what was already 
recognized in the broader analysis of Heidegger‟s hermeneutics, that his phenomenology 
is fundamentally interpretative. Situated as Dasein is between what shows itself in a 
phenomenon and its concealed ground, that which Dasein understands becomes an 
interpretive act of what is possible about its being-in-the-world. This point is developed 
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in understanding as disclosure in terms of possibilities for being. In this way, 
understanding is fundamentally an interpretive act.  
And this is also what makes the attestation of authenticity possible. Each 
disclosure already implies its existentiality. Therefore in authenticity, to foreground 
existentiality in an existentiell disclosure amounts to bringing out explicitly something 
which is already implied therein. Relating the ground of what a possibility is to Dasein‟s 
own understanding activity, Heidegger cannot help but make a circle. This circle reveals 
an opening that is present at the heart of all of Dasein‟s existentiell disclosures that is 
both an attestation of Dasein‟s existential essence, and that also accounts for how 
Dasein‟s existentiell disclosures develop from one another. The movement of this 
development, and how this development can explicitly foreground Dasein‟s 
existentiality, has its own explanation in interpretation.  
 
3.4 Interpretation  
 
In defining the possible project of authenticity, we began with an existentiell and an 
existential understanding of Dasein as its possibility. To that the notion of interpretation 
adds the third component that describes the relational circle between Dasein as 
possibility and Dasein as embedded in various possibilities. Interpretation is not its own 
existential. As was recognized already, all understanding is fundamentally interpretation. 
As a specific aspect of the existential of understanding to be highlighted, interpretation 
describes the development of understanding‟s possibilities.  
As understanding, Dasein projects its being upon possibilities… The 
project of understanding has its own possibility of development. We shall 
call the development of understanding interpretation. In interpretation 
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understanding appropriates what it has understood in an understanding 
way… Interpretation is not the acknowledgment of what has been 
understood, but rather the development of possibilities projected in 
understanding (Heidegger 139).  
 
In its familiar connotation, interpretation is the basis of all theoretical activity. For 
Heidegger, this is the meaning of interpretation in a derivative sense. Just as 
understanding discloses being-in-the-world largely in pre-conceptual possibilities—in 
the “…unthematic, circumspect absorption in the references constitutive for the 
handiness of the totality of useful things,” so too does the development of those 
possibilities in interpretation occur simply as adjustments in everyday coping (Heidegger 
71). Heidegger writes, “The primordial act of interpretation lies not in a theoretical 
sentence, but in circumspectly and heedfully putting away or changing the inappropriate 
tool „without wasting words‟” (Heidegger 147). In changing the inappropriate tool, what 
was understood—the tool‟s inappropriateness —is taken up understandingly. This model 
for how interpretation functions is fundamentally the same one at work in theoretical 
activity as well.  
To grasp the mechanics of interpretation, we begin with the fact that 
understanding has the character of project: “It projects the being of Dasein upon its for-
the-sake-of-which just as primordially as upon significance as the worldliness of its 
actual world” (Heidegger 136). In disclosing its possibilities for being-in-the-world, 
what is projected in understanding is always two things: the world in terms of its 
significance, and Dasein in terms of its meaning. In the example of hammering, what is 
projected is the world as a related totality of significance that connects hammers to 
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materials to buildings. At the same time, what is also projected is that for-the-sake-of-
which Dasein hammers—i.e. to build a shelter for example.  
The for-the-sake-of-which constitutes what is meaningful about Dasein‟s 
possibilities. Therefore, meaning or intelligibility is also always projected in 
understanding. There is nothing to determine what is meaningful about Dasein‟s 
possibilities except Dasein itself. Dasein holds itself in a certain intelligibility which then 
teleologically determines what is possible about its possibilities and also therefore the 
referential significant totality of the world. Heidegger writes, “Only Dasein „has‟ 
meaning in that the disclosedness of being-in-the-world can be „fulfilled‟ through the 
beings discoverable in it. Thus only Dasein can be meaningful or meaningless” 
(Heidegger 142). It is the meaningfulness of Dasein that ultimately determines the 
project character of understanding. In changing the inappropriate tool, the for-the-sake-
of-which is what ultimately guides how Dasein appropriates what is has understood in an 
understanding way.  
The existential character of understanding as project also signifies the inertia that 
understanding carries. There is no neutral starting position from which Dasein ascertains 
its possibilities; interpretation has as its starting point that which Dasein already 
understands. This implicates the character of Dasein in the project of understanding as a 
thrown being, embedded in existentiell disclosures of being-in-the-world that already 
have their intelligibility. That which interpretation does is to bring that intelligibility to 
the fore and make it explicit.  
Interpretation does not, so to speak, throw a „significance‟ over what is 
nakedly objectively present and does not stick a value on it, but what is 
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encountered in the world is always already in a relevance which is 
disclosed in the understanding of world, a relevance which is made 
explicit by interpretation (Heidegger 140).  
 
The fact that relevance must be made explicit suggests that meaning is more often than 
not only implicitly carried along with the possibility. Possibilities are meaningful in 
ways Dasein may grasp more or less in its existentiell situation. At the same time, to 
make the relevance disclosed in understanding explicit does not mean that this 
intelligibility is present substantiality within the possibilities. That which is simply there 
capable of being directly read off its possibilities Heidegger tells us, “…is nothing else 
than the self-evident, undisputed prejudice of the interpreter…” (Heidegger 141). The 
relevance of the world which Dasein makes explicit in interpretation reflects back on the 
meaningfulness in which Dasein holds itself. Therefore, the goal of interpretation is in 
fact in a sense to make the „undisputed prejudice of the interpreter‟ explicit.  
So, on the one hand, intelligibility is a definite part of any existentiell disclosure 
of Dasein. Insofar as Dasein is already embedded in definite possibilities for being, it has 
done so by projecting the meaning of its being in definite ways. This intelligibility is 
what can be made explicit by interpretation. But ultimately, how that relevance relates to 
its possibilities is not grounded in the possibilities, as if no other relevance were 
possible, but is rooted in the understanding that Dasein has projected. The bare 
possibilities themselves, insofar as one can speak of them at all in this way, are always 
phenomena the concealed ground of which Dasein must interpret. The fact that Dasein is 
thrown means that it has already done so, and because the disclosure of understanding 
has ontological import, the understanding it has already reached becomes a new 
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situation—a new phenomena that must be interpreted. When Dasein „appropriates what 
it has understood in an understanding way‟, it is engaged in that process.  
But with interpretation, Heidegger was supposed to have described the 
mechanism by which the development of possibilities in understanding occurs; but so 
far, the recognition of what interpretation does has been limited to making explicit the 
relevance of the world and therefore the meaningfulness that Dasein carries itself in. But 
this is, in fact, all that interpretation does. In „making explicit‟ or appropriating „what it 
has understood in an understanding way‟, Dasein is engaged in interpretation—that is to 
say, Dasein is developing what the possibilities mean to it. Interpretation is never once 
done and over with, but is an ongoing part of projecting possibilities for being. And the 
inertia of projection ensures that there is always a new existentiell situation that Dasein 
finds itself that it needs to interpret its possibilities relative to.  
As concerns authenticity, because interpretation is the development of 
understanding, an authentic potentiality for being a self will occur only on the basis of an 
interpretation that projects Dasein‟s possibilities into the truth of its being as possibility. 
Interpretation is therefore the key for clarifying the possibility of authenticity. But since 
what is disclosed in understanding is being-in-the-world, which always has concrete 
ontological significance, a theoretical acknowledgement of the truth of its being is not 
sufficient. To understand its being in an understanding way is still an ontological project. 
To that effect, since Dasein is always situated existentielly in concrete possibilities for 
being a self, the interpretation that develops those possibilities authentically will always 
have to transform whatever existentiell possibilities it is disclosed as. Dasein is its 
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disclosure, which is a limitation that pertains to an authentic potentiality for being a self 
as well. Authenticity as a project is pushed into the particulars of its factical existence. In 
order to project its authentic existentiell possibility to be itself, it must do so by 
effectively bridging its factical disclosure, thereby tethering what it means to be 
authentic to concrete conditions of its existentiell existence.  
 
3.5 The role of being-with and the they in understanding  
 
If Dasein is factically its existentiell situation, and if that situation is relevant for the 
project of an authentic potentiality for being a self, then what it means for Dasein to be 
its existentiell situation must be further clarified. A few interesting questions are raised 
in this regards. First, from where do existentiell possibilities come? And what does it 
mean for Dasein to exist as possibilities as opposed to being a being with possibilities? 
And finally, from where do Dasein‟s interpretations come?  
In the introduction, Heidegger tells us that “Dasein has either chosen these 
possibilities itself, stumbled upon them, or in each instance already grown up in them.” 
(Heidegger 10). This is further developed in division I, Chapter IV, where Heidegger 
introduces the concepts of being-with others, the Mitdasein, and the they. The reality of 
growing up in possibilities or stumbling upon them is grounded in the fact that Dasein‟s 
world is a world shared with and largely created by other Dasein. The world that “…is 
always already from the outset my own” (Heidegger 111), is from the outset a with-
world: “…the world is always already the one that I share with the others. The world of 
Dasein is a with-world. Being-in is being-with others” (Heidegger 111-112). Dasein 
takes care of the world in ways anticipated for it by other Dasein. In walking down the 
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sidewalk, Dasein is disclosing its potentiality for being in accordance with a world that it 
did not create. For the most part, Dasein conforms to the world in this way.  
In addition, these possibilities for being are themselves possible only with the 
participation of other Dasein, such as listening to the radio, taking public transport, 
playing sports, buying groceries. In the possibilities that I exist as, many of them include 
other Dasein in their very constitution, which then reflects on my self-understanding. 
Heidegger writes, “Knowing oneself is grounded in primordially understanding being-
with. It operates initially in accordance with the nearest kind of being of being-together-
in-the-world in the understanding knowledge of what Dasein circumspectly finds and 
takes care of with the others” (Heidegger 116). In the nearest kind of being of everyday 
taking care of the world, my Dasein does not resonate in any distinction from the other 
Dasein, but is rather one with the other Dasein in the anonymous understanding that 
accompanies all our everyday possibilities. This directly gives rise to the notion of the 
they, which answers the question of the “who” of everyday Dasein. If Dasein is 
existentielly defined by its possibilities, and if those possibilities are largely as universal 
as using a sidewalk, then the self-understanding that arises on the basis of those 
possibilities is just as universal.  
Concerning the last mode of coming into its possibilities—choice, although 
Dasein sometimes legitimately experiences a choice between possibilities, it does not 
have a choice in the fact that the possibilities that it does exist as determine its 
existentiell factical identity, irrespective of whether Dasein chooses to put importance in 
them or not. But, for the most part, Dasein doesn‟t generally choose its possibilities for 
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being. Nor does choosing provide a possible alternative to this state of things. Dasein 
chooses from what it is familiar with, and what it is familiar with is determined by the 
world it is part and parcel of. Radical choice is never a reality in a world where 
possibilities are finite and founded in the familiarity of the closest tradition into which 
Dasein is raised. 
This relates to the first of our two challenges to a purely subjectivistic-
individualistic emphasis placed on the meaning of authenticity. The fact that at the end 
of Being and Time Heidegger relates authentic Dasein to its generation, thereby raising 
social-historical dimensions of what it means to be authentic, finds initial ground in what 
was elaborated above concerning how Dasein comes into its possibilities for being for 
the most part, and how many of those possibilities are inter-relational in their 
constitution. In the discussion of Dasein‟s essential historicity, Heidegger asks, 
“…whence in general can the possibilities be drawn upon which Dasein factically 
projects itself?” (Heidegger 350). The answer, which implicates Dasein in and with its 
generation, is from its heritage which resoluteness takes over as thrown: “The 
resoluteness in which Dasein comes back to itself discloses the actual factical 
possibilities of authentic existing in terms of the heritage which that resoluteness takes 
over as thrown” (Heidegger 351). Without the initial grounds in what it means to be a 
possibility and the provenance of those possibilities through the existential of being-with 
other Dasein, the connection of Dasein‟s authenticity to taking over its heritage would 
remain puzzling set against the subjectivistic-individualistic emphasis. Therefore, what it 
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means to belong to one‟s self in authenticity must preserve this fundamental constituting 
fact of Dasein‟s existence if it is to resurface later in Dasein‟s historicity.  
But far from delegitimizing the subjectivistic-individualistic emphasis placed on 
authenticity, it deepens the problematic. In resoluteness, Dasein takes over possibilities 
from the tradition in which it is thrown, “…although not necessarily as traditional ones” 
(Heidegger 351). If the possibilities Dasein takes over from its heritage in resoluteness 
are not identical to the ones articulated by that tradition, is that enough leeway in the 
meaning of those possibilities that they can be considered individual to Dasein, 
validating the subjectivistic-individualistic emphasis? Could Dasein‟s destiny with its 
generation be a destiny of one authentic world-historical individual that transforms its 
being-with others? The resolution of these questions ultimately pushes the problematic 
towards the clarification of interpretation as the development of Dasein‟s possibilities. 
Because the locus of interpretation is Dasein, it could matter little if Dasein‟s 
possibilities are socially and historically constituted if an interpretation that develops 
them authentically individualizes them.  
 
3.6 Interpretation and discourse  
 
It was shown how authenticity relates to the project nature of understanding as is 
developed by interpretation. The final existential to consider as it will affect authenticity 
is discourse. In the introduction to the sections on “The Existential Constitution of the 
There,” Heidegger writes that “Attunement and understanding are equiprimordially 
determined by discourse” (Heidegger 126). Discourse is described as “The existential-
ontological foundation of language…” (Heidegger 150). Discourse pertains to the very 
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“…articulation of intelligibility,” and as such has an especially important relationship to 
interpretation that becomes relevant for this analysis (Heidegger 150).  
It was already recognized that interpretation concerns the intelligibility of 
possibilities by making explicit the meaning carried along in understanding. In 
interpretation, Dasein has an opening into altering the development of its possibilities 
according to the meaning it discloses therein. If discourse is the „articulation of 
intelligibility‟, then in relation to interpretation it stands as the constituting grounds of 
interpretation—all interpretation occurs within the bounds of discourse. These bounds 
delimit the ways in which for Dasein everything is communicable. As the foundation of 
language, it is more than words or symbolic expression, it is all the significant 
expressiveness of Dasein: “Discourse is the articulation in accordance with significance 
of the attuned intelligibility of being-in-the-world” (Heidegger 152).  
As the totality of expressiveness of Dasein, discourse comes about through 
being-with others and belongs to the Mitdasein. Especially in avenues of self-expression, 
Dasein exploits possibilities that it can never lay claim on as uniquely its own, but 
always occurs in and out of the context of intelligibility established in discourse through 
being-with others. Heidegger writes, “Being-with is „explicitly‟ shared in discourse” 
(Heidegger 152). With interpretation, the situation is no different. All the meaning that 
Dasein makes explicit in interpretation can only come about in the intelligibility 
established in discourse. Therefore, discourse becomes the background condition for 
what meaning Dasein finds in its understanding.  
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This becomes relevant for authenticity in that interpretation as the vehicle of the 
development of possibilities in understanding, needs to develop Dasein‟s possibilities 
towards its ownmost potentiality for being a self, but will be necessarily determined in 
its effort to do so by the possibilities of expression available in discourse. This 
constitutes the second challenge to the subjectivistic-individualistic emphasis placed on 
authenticity in Being and Time outlined above. The public provenance of discourse 
becomes the fertile ground for the they to dominate interpretation. Heidegger writes, 
“Dasein is initially and in certain limits constantly entrusted to this interpretedness that 
directs and apportions the possibilities of the average understanding and the attunement 
belonging to it” (Heidegger 157). Thereby, Dasein interprets itself and develops its 
possibilities in the direction of the everyday inauthentic way of being a self. Heidegger is 
clear that interpretation can never transcend the limitations of discourse. He writes, 
“Dasein can never escape the everyday way of being interpreted into which Dasein has 
grown initially. All genuine understanding, interpreting and communication, rediscovery 
and new appropriation come about in it and out of it and against it” (Heidegger 159). 
This means that an authentic potentiality for being a self cannot arise from an 
interpretation that takes its meaning from a sphere of intelligibility outside of the 
everyday inauthentic way of being interpreted.  
The problem of the relationship of discourse to authenticity is a formidable one 
because it affects the development of possibilities in interpretation, striking at the heart 
of how an authentic possibility for being a self can come about. Therefore, it poses a real 
challenge to the subjectivistic-individualistic emphasis read into authenticity. Unlike the 
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possible response to the first challenge, the fact that Dasein is the locus of interpretation 
will not supersede any social-historical claims that affect interpretation itself. If 
possibilities for interpretation originate in a social-historical context, then by means of 
interpretation it will be difficult to develop possibilities that are individual to Dasein. To 
accept the fact that all interpretation comes out of the everyday way of being interpreted 
into which Dasein has grown means either that it is necessary to attribute to Heidegger's 
presentation the tension that this creates with the notion that authenticity individualizes 
Dasein, or it means to pull back from an overly subjectivistic-individualistic account of 
authenticity.  
 
3.7 Conclusions  
 
The inquiry into the existentials of every existentiell being-in-the-world helped to clarify 
how the descriptions of authenticity can be better grounded relative to the way in which 
Dasein is its being concretely. In the existential of understanding, Dasein is existentielly 
defined in terms of possibilities for being. Initially and for the most part, the “who” of 
Dasein‟s possibilities is the they. But at the heart of what it means to be a possibility is 
possibility itself that corresponds to the disclosive openness of Dasein‟s essential 
existential constitution. This opening creates the circle in understanding the movement 
of which is described in interpretation.  
As the development of possibilities projected in understanding, interpretation is 
the only window through which something like a subjectivistic-individualistic emphasis 
on authenticity can be properly grounded. Through interpretation, the meaning and 
therefore the identity of Dasein‟s possibilities is established. Since Dasein is the locus of 
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interpretation, it is possible that it can develop its possibilities in accordance with an 
intelligibility that is its own, giving them its own identity. However, one must then 
resolve the problem of how it can do so when intelligibility itself is the provenance of 
discourse which comes out of being-with others.  
But what has not been asked as of yet is what concretely the subjectivistic-
individualistic emphasis read into authenticity implies. Does it suggest Dasein‟s factical 
particularity, its ontic solipsism, or its metaphysical isolation? And once this is clarified, 
the argument must proceed from the other direction as well and ask whether any of these 
possibilities find their justification in Being and Time. 
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From a perspective of the whole scope of the project of Being and Time, the meaning of 
authenticity is linked to the question of the meaning of being as an existentiell attestation 
that the meaning of Dasein‟s being has the self-transcendent structure of understanding 
that Heidegger comes to define as “care.” Catching sight of this possibility constitutes a 
kind of proof that confirms the hypothesis that Dasein‟s ontic distinction is that it is 
ontological. If the meaning of Dasein‟s being can be secured in this manner, on this basis 
the way opens up for an understanding of the meaning of being in general. For the 
phenomenology of Dasein, an existentiell attestation is the only possible means of a 
confirmation of this fact.  
But as the notion of authenticity is elaborated through the analytic of Dasein, a 
different kind of presentation takes shape. A summation statement of the ways in which 
authenticity is described in Being and Time is that: mineness is the grounds of the 
possibility that Dasein can retrieve itself from the anonymous social normativity of the 
they and explicitly grasp itself through an individuation made possible by anticipation. 
Authenticity is the existentiell achievement of this individuated explicit self-retrieve. 
These descriptions lend to authenticity a subjectivistic-individualistic descriptive 
emphasis.  
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Between the meaning of authenticity as it fits into the question of the meaning of 
being, and the descriptions of authentic Dasein that lend it a subjectivistic-individualistic 
emphasis, the necessary connection must be made. How does manifesting the 
transcendent structure of care equate with Dasein‟s belonging to itself? The fundamental 
question to be answered can be reduced to the following: what does becoming 
individualized have to do with being authentic?  
The initial approach, based on taking the subjectivistic-individualistic 
descriptions of authenticity at face value, was an exegesis of the existentials that go into 
every existentiell disclosure. Perhaps in explaining the structure of what it means for 
Dasein to be its Da-, to be its there in the world, it would have become evident the ways 
in which Dasein could be an individualized being-there. This approach reached its limit 
in the tension that discourse creates with the possibility of an individualized 
interpretation. Surveying the literature on Heidegger, more than a few commentaries 
reach an impasse in understanding authenticity on precisely this point. But for those that 
find themselves in this situation, their difficulty is not without value. This aporia in 
understanding authenticity becomes itself illustrative of how these commentaries 
incorporate the subjectivistic-individualistic emphasis in the descriptions of authenticity 
into the understanding of what authenticity entails. Therefore, a look into how some of 
these commentaries perceive the problem in authenticity also becomes instructive for 
deconstructing the critical unexamined question behind this entire inquiry: mainly, in 
what unified sense are we supposed to understand what these subjectivistic-
individualistic descriptions add up to? Once those assumptions for the meaning of 
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authenticity are fore-grounded, this will lead the way back to Heidegger to search for the 
textual justification for the kinds of subjectivistic-individualistic emphases that are 
grounded therein. In the end, a non-subjectivistic understanding of what it means to be 
individualized in authenticity has to be articulated to get past the aporia caused by an 
overly individualistic-subjectivistic interpretation. 
 
4.2 Authenticity as ontic individuality  
As was evident through the analysis of the existentials of every existentiell disclosure, a 
literal interpretation of the subjectivistic-individualistic emphasis on the meaning of 
authenticity reaches an impasse in a point of tension between interpretation and 
discourse. If Dasein is supposed to develop its possibilities through an interpretation that 
projects its ownmost possibility for being, how can it accomplish this task if the 
intelligibility that is necessary for interpretation comes out of inauthentic everyday 
being-with others? The fact that this is the sticking point is attested to by Taylor Carman 
and Piotr Hoffman.  
Interpretation has no choice but to accommodate and exploit the 
prevailing criteria of intelligibility, which means at least to some extent 
trading the irreducible particularity of one's own factical situation for 
generally adequate, but always more or less loosely fitting means of 
expressing and communicating it (Malpas and Wrathall 21).  
 
In fact, one of the tasks of Heidegger scholarship remains the task of 
coming to terms with the tension between those individualistic and 
subjectivistic aspects of Heidegger‟s philosophy, on the one hand, and his 
simultaneous stress on the inevitably public character of intelligibility and 
significance, on the other (Guignon 240).  
 
In both Carman and Hoffman we see at one pole of the friction the public interpretedness 
of discourse, what Carman identifies here as the „loosely fitting means of expressing and 
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communicating‟ that Dasein has at its disposal. But whereas at the other pole of the 
friction Hoffman merely gestures in general to „those individualistic and subjectivistic 
aspects of Heidegger‟s philosophy‟, Carman identifies it more specifically in the 
„irreducible particularity of one‟s own factical situation‟. In this we have the first 
substantive possibility of translating the descriptions of authenticity into their supposed 
ontological consequence for Dasein. For Carman, the tension between interpretation and 
discourse is rooted in the assumption of Dasein‟s factical (i.e. ontic) particularity . The 
belief that in authenticity Dasein achieves factical particularity constitutes the first of the 
possible ways of understanding how authenticity is Dasein‟s ownmost possibility.  
But it is in fact a question of critical interpretive significance whether or not 
authenticity implies an existentiell particularity for Dasein. Authentic anticipation 
individualizes Dasein, but does that at the same time imply that in authenticity each 
Dasein achieves a unique existentiell potentiality for being a self in accordance with its 
individuation? By taking this position on the meaning of authenticity, Carman sets in 
motion the interpretive framework within which he consequently reaches the impasse 
between discourse and interpretation. Hoffman perhaps wisely holds back from making 
a similar commitment, but he might think so too, or else wherein would the source of the 
tension be that he identifies? For the „public character of intelligibility‟ to be seen as a 
source of „tension‟, this seems justified most readily on an assumption of Dasein‟s 
factical particularity. However, if Dasein‟s factical particularity is not assumed, what 
reason would we have to believe that the public character of intelligibility, and Dasein‟s 
tendency to fall prey to it, causes tension for authenticity?  
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If factical particularity is to be justified, there are two ways that this is possible: 
initially, or through anticipation.  
Initially, we know that factical particularity is not in the least justified, because 
that would mean that the possibilities that Dasein exists as in understanding and the 
interpretation that determines their meaning would be identified as particular to it. But as 
was evident in the discussion of the genesis of our possibilities, Dasein‟s disclosed 
existence consists of possibilities for being that are not in the least particular to its 
engagement. Dasein exists in a world shared with and prepared for by other Dasein. 
Furthermore, the meaning of these possibilities that Dasein has grown into are 
articulated by the interpretation of the they in idle talk. This constituting the self-
understanding closest to each Dasein, it is the case that initially and for the most part, 
particularity does not belong to Dasein in any serious existentiell way.  
However, the principal grounds in support of Dasein‟s factical particularity in 
Being and Time is not through an initial presumption, but rather through the projection 
of possibilities involved in becoming authentic that consequently individuates Dasein. 
On this reading, ontic individuality is the accomplishment of authenticity. And as an 
accomplishment of a projection of possibilities, ontic individuality will have its basis in 
interpretation as the development of Dasein‟s understanding. Already, the analysis of 
interpretation recognized that the meaning of Dasein‟s possibilities is not grounded in 
the possibilities themselves, but rather in the interpretation that makes sense of them. 
Therefore, it matters little for authenticity that initially and for the most part Dasein‟s 
existentiell existence is factically in its situation the exact opposite of particular to it. If 
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meaning is determined through interpretation, then the factical particularity of Dasein‟s 
existence can still be achieved if the authentic interpretation can instill unique meaning 
into Dasein‟s possibilities.  
Notwithstanding the already recognized unresolved tension that this reading of 
authenticity leads to by creating friction between interpretation and discourse, ontic 
individuality can be evaluated through reference to the section on being-toward-death in 
division II. It is here that the positive project of authenticity begins to be outlined. Being-
toward-death grounds the ontological possibility that interpretation will be able to 
project Dasein‟s ownmost possibilities for being. Therefore, it is in the anticipation of 
dying, or being-toward-death, that the possibility that authenticity individuates Dasein 
existentielly must find its justification.  
 
4.3 Being-toward-death  
 
In the discussion of being-toward-death we find the start of the analysis that outlines 
existentially the possibility of an attestation of authentic Dasein. The description of 
dying can be reduced to two essential features. The first is its ownmost, 
nonrepresentational quality.  
Insofar as it „is,‟ death is always essentially my own. And it indeed 
signifies a peculiar possibility of being in which it is absolutely a matter 
of the being of my own Dasein. In dying, it becomes evident that death is 
ontologically constituted by mineness and existence (Heidegger 223).  
 
Unlike other possibilities for being, dying is something which every Dasein must take on 
itself: “No one can take the other‟s dying away from him” (Heidegger 223). Dasein 
cannot flee into inauthentic everydayness when it takes its dying upon itself. The they 
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can reduce talk about death to a level of generic abstraction, but Dasein cannot substitute 
its own projection of possibilities for a generalized way of understanding itself when its 
dying is at stake. Because dying uniquely has this quality, it provides a window of 
opportunity for Dasein to project possibilities for being that will be its ownmost, 
authentic ones.  
The second feature is that dying is a possibility that is imminent rather than 
conceived of as an event that Dasein can project out ahead of itself as something not yet 
objectively present. Heidegger writes, “The ending that we have in view when we speak 
of death, does not signify a being-at-an-end of Dasein, but rather a being toward the end 
of this being. Death is a way to be that Dasein takes over as soon as it is” (Heidegger 
228). An existential understanding of dying cannot conceive of death in terms of the 
termination of being, because Dasein‟s end cannot be projected in its understanding: “As 
an essential structural factor of care, „being ahead of itself‟ cannot be eliminated” 
(Heidegger 220). Dasein can never understand itself in terms of the elimination of its 
possibility to be, as that contradicts the basis of its self-understanding to begin with. 
Therefore, an existential understanding of death can only conceive of death in terms of 
dying: “Let the term dying stand for the way of being in which Dasein is toward its 
death” (Heidegger 229). What is relevant about death for the analytic of Dasein is how it 
exists as dying. This gives death its imminent, existential quality, as Dasein is always 
already dying.  
It is these qualities that characterize dying that afford the opportunity for 
interpretation to develop Dasein‟s authentic possibilities. If Dasein projects its 
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possibilities as a being-toward-death, the ownmost nonrelational quality of that 
possibility can put Dasein‟s possibilities in a context of meaningfulness that is its own. 
This requires that dying as a possibility that is imminent in all that Dasein identifies in 
its understanding be maintained in that light.  
… if being-toward-death has to disclose understandingly the possibility 
which we have characterized as such, then in such being-toward-death 
this possibility must not be weakened, it must be understood as 
possibility, cultivated as possibility, and endured as possibility in our 
relation to it (Heidegger 241). 
 
Ultimately what seems important about dying is not simply that it represents the 
finiteness of all of Dasein‟s possibilities, but that it creates the opening in Dasein‟s 
possibilities that allows for its development in interpretation. If it were not for the fact 
that Dasein as its possibilities is always essentially dying, there would not be the 
corresponding freedom for the development of its being. Therefore the finitude of dying 
corresponds to the freedom of Dasein‟s essential essence as possibility.  
 
4.4 Lawrence Vogel and Piotr Hoffman 
Being-toward-death as the existential possibility of an interpretation that develops 
Dasein's ownmost authentic possibilities means that the death analysis figures centrally 
into any argument that the individualizing effect of anticipation should be read in a 
subjectivistic-individualistic way. In the initial exegesis of understanding and its 
development in interpretation, it was evident that interpretation carried the possibility for 
radical individuation. Being-toward-death perhaps only further confirms this in that the 
description entails that “The nonrelational character of death understood in anticipation 
individualizes Dasein down to itself” (Heidegger 243). Lawrence Vogel presents an 
     63 
 
 
argument that shows how the subjectivistic-individualistic conclusions for authenticity 
can be based on the analysis of being-toward-death.  
Heidegger surely invites this existentialist interpretation and so makes 
himself vulnerable to the charges that his philosophy is radically 
individualistic, egocentric, voluntaristic, and decisionistic. The problem 
with Heidegger's account of authenticity is that the nonrelational, 
individualizing character of Being-towards-death appears to subvert the 
prior claim that others have on my will insofar as I am a moral agent. The 
centrality and tone of the death-analysis makes it seem like the experience 
of my mortality, rather than revealing me not to be the center of the 
world, shows just the opposite: that the significance of entities within my 
world depends wholly on my projects. The individuating power of Being-
towards-death drives a wedge between the self and nature and between 
the individual and the community. Heidegger's insistence that anxiety and 
authenticity do not take us out of the world but lead to a more primordial 
engagement does not resolve the tensions between Being-unto-death on 
the one hand and Being-in-the-world and Being-with-Others on the other 
(Vogel 38).  
 
According to Vogel, being-toward-death „drives a wedge between the self and nature 
and between the individual and the community‟. And despite whatever emphasis 
Heidegger places on being-in-the-world as fundamentally socially and historically 
contextualized, this „does not resolve the tensions‟ that are created as a result of being-
toward-death‟s fundamentally individualizing effect that makes it so that the significance 
of the others and moral normativity in the end „depends wholly on my projects‟—i.e. the 
projection of Dasein‟s own possibilities in authentic interpretation.  
Vogel identifies the root of the problem in the fact that once the nonrelational 
character of being-toward-death individualizes Dasein down to itself, it removes Dasein 
from the claim that any social-historical or moral values have on it, and reveals them to 
be contingent on Dasein‟s own projection of possibilities. Vogel, therefore, similarly to 
Carman and Hoffman, invokes the notion of a tension between the structures of being-
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in-the-world and being-with others. At the same time, Vogel separates himself from 
making the claim of factical particularity attributed to Carman. He recognizes that the 
social-historical dimensions speak against a purely subjectivistic-individualistic 
emphasis on authenticity. Instead, he argues that being-toward-death creates a general 
vacuum in the meaningfulness of Dasein‟s possibilities, and leaves Dasein to resolve 
upon them arbitrarily. He argues that Heidegger provides no evaluative criteria by which 
this newly self-aware Dasein, freed from the authority of the they, is to decide its fate. 
And although resoluteness thrusts us back into the social-historical context from which 
our possibilities derive and are fundamentally limited, we are left without a compass in 
navigating within the tradition we are bound, and are certainly left without criteria to 
evaluate the possibilities of our tradition against itself.  
Heidegger offers as his standard our confrontation with death. But even 
he admits that anticipation in the face of Being-unto-death, though a 
necessary aspect of the standard for authentic choice, is not sufficient. 
And so he refers us to resoluteness in the face of our historical 
thrownness to supplement anticipation and to provide it with content. But 
this casts his concept of authentic choice into a vicious circle. On the one 
hand, choice is supposed to free one from the contingencies of the 
historical possibilities in which one actually finds oneself. On the other 
hand, choice is rooted in historicity, in the possibilities in which one 
actually finds oneself. But to say that the possibilities to be chosen are 
those that are in fact given provides no criterion for choice among 
possibilities. Authenticity, therefore, collapses into irrational decision 
(Vogel 60).  
 
This is what Vogel, borrowing from Charles Guignon, labels as Heidegger‟s “evaluative 
nihilism.” Despite the description that Heidegger gives us of Dasein as a thrown 
projection, Vogel concludes that "The ontological insight that we are a 'stretching along' 
between past and future and so are subject to both compulsion and freedom does not 
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provide us with any directive as to how to appropriate the past" (FW 59). For Dasein to 
be cast into a position of „evaluative nihilism‟ suggests that the nonrelational effect of 
being-toward-death radically de-situates Dasein from its world such that it stands over 
and against its possibilities. For Vogel, this seems to indicate that the meaning of the 
individuation that being-towards-death entails is in revealing to each Dasein its ontic 
isolation in making the world meaningful.  
Unlike what Carman and Hoffman posit, for Vogel it is not the generic nature of 
discourse that forces a point of tension with the possibility that authenticity 
individualizes Dasein. Recognizing the rootedness of the social-historical context—that 
„choice is rooted in historicity‟—perhaps Vogel sees that the projection of Dasein‟s 
possibilities in interpretation is too much bound by these circumstances to seriously 
argue that the individualizing effect of authenticity implies Dasein‟s factical 
particularity. Vogel finds a different meaning for individuation, which is that Dasein, 
faced with the otherness of its possibilities, yet forced to choose, is trapped in an 
evaluative nihilism wherein the only standard for choosing is whatever calls forth from 
its own interpretative inclination. Vogel‟s Heidegger carries the Sartrean sympathy that 
man is condemned to be free. So although not arguing for ontic particularity as the 
meaning of the individuation of authenticity, Vogel rather argues for an ontic solipsism 
instead.  
Yet Vogel‟s analysis is deeply connected to that of Carman‟s and Hoffman‟s. 
Vogel is only one step removed from ontic particularity by his attempt to reconcile the 
social-historical elements yet maintain the subjectivistic-individualistic emphasis. The 
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difference between them is in the conclusions they draw more so than in a fundamental 
difference in their understanding of being-toward-death. In all three commentators, it is 
being-toward-death that causes tension between being-in-the-world and being-with 
others.  
Piotr Hoffman was already identified as a possible proponent of the view that the 
individuation entailed in being-toward-death is meant to bring Dasein to the ontic 
particularity of its existence. Although he himself is careful to limit the force of his 
conclusions, there is good indication that this is what he believes when he identifies a 
tension between the public character of intelligibility as determined by discourse and the 
individuation that arises through being-toward-death.  
Vogel was illustrative of how being-toward-death can be seized upon to give 
force to a subjectivistic-individualistic understanding of authenticity. But in Hoffman we 
have the added benefit of an exegesis of the chapter that illuminates textually how the 
connection is made between being-toward-death and authenticity that establishes it as 
fundamentally subjectivistic-individualistic. Hoffman writes, “I hope to show, however, 
that in Division II of Being and Time Heidegger reveals himself as an heir to that 
[subjectivist] tradition and to its model of the human self” (Guignon 222). This 
conclusion will ultimately be based on the endorsement of the understanding that “...as it 
will soon become clear, Dasein‟s authenticity requires the lucid acceptance of one‟s own 
death…” (Guignon 223). It is these two related features of Hoffman‟s analysis—the 
emphasis on death‟s inherent subjectivity, and the resulting need for its lucid 
acceptance—that establishes the subjectivistic-individualistic reading of being-toward-
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death that then supports conclusions such as those of ontic particularity and ontic 
solipsism.  
In the first place, Hoffman repeatedly refers to the key themes of division II upon 
which authenticity and everything else hinges as dimensions of Dasein‟s subjectivity, 
which in the end he concludes places Heidegger in a similar vein of the Western 
philosophical tradition as other subjectivist writers.  
But Dasein‟s linkup with a historical community does not remove from 
Dasein‟s structure its dimension of subjectivity. On the contrary, Dasein 
reveals itself as rooted in its historical community only by exploring the 
full depths of its own subjectivity—of its finitude, its freedom, its guilt, 
and so on. And these themes—the key themes of Division II of Being and 
Time—can be found not only in the classical writers of the subjectivist 
tradition (in Descartes, Kant, Fichte), but indeed, in its final and most 
radical version, existentialism. One is thus perfectly legitimate in drawing 
parallels between Heidegger and such radically subjectivistic writers as 
Kierkegaard, Sartre, and Camus (Guignon 240).  
 
At first it seems almost innocuous that finitude, freedom, and guilt are treated as 
elements of Dasein‟s „subjectivity‟. But Heidegger himself never makes use of this term 
in Being and Time and it therefore has a problematic meaning to try and fit in with the 
rest of the technical terminology of Being and Time. The first question we must ask in 
regards to „subjectivity‟ is whether the term as is commonly made use of in the Western 
philosophical tradition fits in with Heidegger‟s fundamental ontology as an existential or 
existentiell determination of Dasein‟s existence. If Dasein is equiprimordially being-in-
the-world and being-with others, does subjectivity simply refer to the existential 
structures implied in being-in-the-world only? A consequence of this would be that all of 
Dasein‟s possibilities that are constituted by being-with other Dasein would be deemed 
inauthentic, problematizing the social-historical references to authenticity.  
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An indication of how an assumption of subjectivity shapes the analysis can be 
seen in the subtle psychological character that the theme of dying takes on in relation to 
Dasein‟s projection of possibilities.  
At the same time—and due to the very same circumstance of my total 
vulnerability to death—the complete identity that I envision as 
attributable to me remains my identity. For my first-person sense of death 
establishes my life not only as a totality, but also as uniquely mine—that 
is, not as an intersection of social and natural roles and functions that I 
share, or may share, with others. Heidegger‟s justification of this 
important connection—death gives my life its „totality‟ and its „mineness‟ 
(Jemeinigkeit) as well—is simple [BT 283-4] (Guignon 225).  
 
For Hoffman, „my first-person sense of death establishes‟ the uniqueness of „my 
identity‟, which then satisfies the mineness that is the existential condition of Dasein's 
authenticity. The lucid acceptance of dying that Hoffman concludes being-toward-death 
to entail can only be understood as an existentiell experience that Dasein, out of its first-
person perspective, relates to in its being. For Hoffman, the themes of division II—
death, guilt, conscience—are read as psychological phenomena of Dasein‟s factical 
existence that have the potential of being used to pivot Dasein‟s projection of 
possibilities towards that which is its ownmost. Death is always my death, not qua 
existential Dasein, but qua my existentiell experience. This is perhaps why Hoffman 
labels these themes as belonging to Dasein‟s subjectivity, and why he sees Heidegger‟s 
philosophy as having a remarkable kinship with Existentialists such as Kierkegaard, 
Sartre, and Camus.  
In Hoffman‟s analysis, the ownmost, nonrelational nature of being-toward-death 
means that dying pertains to my Dasein only insofar as I am myself in my subjectivity, 
not insofar as I am in my Dasein a being-with. This equates the meaning of Dasein‟s 
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being with a fundamental existential subjectivity through which it can retrieve itself 
from lostness in the they by projecting its possibilities through the individualizing pivot 
of its being-toward-death. This puts the „I‟ as existentially primary and the relationships 
to others as derivative. In doing so, dying as a concept invariably shifts from being 
purely existential to carrying the existentiell connotation that through an authentic 
appropriation of one‟s dying, Dasein can be reduced to its being-in-the-world 
individuated from the others.  
It is precisely this assumption of subjectivity in the concept of dying that sets the 
stage for the interpretations of authenticity such as those that conclude ontic particularity 
and ontic solipsism, because they take an existentiell meaning of dying as the basis for 
their conclusions that the individuation of authenticity has an existentiell significance.  
 
4.5 Refutation of anticipation as existentiell dying  
At first it is difficult to see in which way Hoffman‟s reading of being-toward-death 
differs from how Heidegger himself presents it. It is Heidegger, after all, that surrounds 
these themes with such dramatic flourish, for example, when he writes that in 
anticipation of dying Dasein is “…itself in passionate anxious freedom toward 
death…” (Heidegger 245). But despite the effusive prose surrounding dying, there are 
substantial reasons to argue against conceiving of death as an element of Dasein‟s 
subjectivity.  
The first thing one must remember is that these themes upon which the analytic 
proceeds are specifically chosen from Dasein‟s everydayness as the doxa that are 
subsequently clarified into existential structures. They become technical terminology 
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with meanings rarefied from their commonsense origin. Keeping this in mind, this 
should dissuade from any overly literal interpretation of the phenomena. But this is a 
problem that Heidegger himself invites by using everyday concepts as the basis of a 
philosophical investigation. In this vein, the problem with Hoffman‟s reading of being-
toward-death is that it means that authenticity hinges on expecting and enduring 
Dasein‟s dying in a literal fashion, turning anticipation into an existentiell phenomenon. 
And although expecting and enduring dying may characterize Dasein in its authentic 
possibilities, it is difficult to believe that Dasein, acting resolutely, projects its 
possibilities into its subjective dying, as dramatically appealing as this may be. 
Unfortunately, one of the reasons Being and Time can be initially so appealing to first-
time readers is precisely this dramatic element that seems to call on one to be 
courageously resolute in the face of their mortality.  
This also runs counter to what Heidegger writes at the very end of the chapter 
concerning the scope of the analysis of being-toward-death.  
The existential project in which anticipation has been delimited, has made 
visible the ontological possibility of an existentiell, authentic being-
toward-death. But with this, the possibility then appears of an authentic 
potentiality-for-being-a-whole—but only as an ontological possibility… 
And yet this existentially „possible‟ being-toward-death remains, after all, 
existentially a fantastical demand. The ontological possibility of an 
authentic potentiality-for-being-a-whole of Dasein means nothing as long 
as the corresponding ontic potentiality-of-being has not been shown in 
terms of Dasein itself (Heidegger 246).  
 
Existentielly, a possible being-toward-death remains „a fantastical demand‟. What has 
been demonstrated is only the „ontological possibility‟ of what will be the existentiell 
attestation of being-toward-death (i.e. resoluteness). At this point in the project of Being 
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and Time, Heidegger has yet to consider how an existentiell being-toward-death will be 
achieved. Certainly, then, it falls short of the scope of the discussion to have discussed 
Dasein‟s anticipation of death as precisely that mechanism that establishes Dasein‟s 
authenticity. Anticipation is not formally an existentiell phenomenon, but it would have 
to be if dying is conceived of as an element of Dasein‟s subjectivity.  
Instead, what Heidegger is doing is grounding the a priori (existential) 
possibility for authenticity in the first place. At the start of division II, Heidegger 
reminds us that the analysis of division I was incomplete as it only described Dasein in 
its everyday inauthenticity. The structures there do not provide an avenue for outlining 
the possibility of authenticity. Division II would start by laying the ground for the 
possibility of authentic Dasein, which means providing its existential justification. The 
question to be answered in Chapter I of division II is whether or not Dasein can be 
authentic at all. Is it ontologically possible that this being can manifest its essence as 
existence existentielly? And what are the existential structures that support this? Being-
toward-death is meant to be the existential justification that makes possible such an 
existentiell attestation. Because Dasein is being-toward-death, it can be authentic.  
Initially, being-toward-death is the discussion of an existential of Dasein‟s being. 
Only in the discussion of resoluteness does it become an existentiell possibility. This 
distinction effectively separates the actual existentiell content of resolutely anticipating 
dying in its possibilities from the ontological characterization of it existing in such a 
way. The fact that being-toward-death is Dasein's ownmost possibility is not yet a 
statement about the content of that possibility, about where it comes from, “who” it 
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concerns, and whether its intelligibility will be rooted in discourse or not . This means 
that the existentiell denial of death could be an authentic existential being-toward-death 
as well. To think otherwise, limits what authenticity looks like to instances when Dasein 
projects its possibilities always during a meditation on its mortality.  
 
4.6 Subjectivity  
If dying is meant only as an ontological characterization of a possible interpretation—
one that pertains to Dasein in the totality of its structures as being-in-the-world together 
with other Dasein—does that mean that it is not an element of Dasein‟s subjectivity? 
The answer can be both yes and no, depending on how the traditional notion of 
„subjectivity‟ finds its place in an understanding of what it means to be human that is 
split between an existential and an existentiell reality. In a lecture given during the 
summer semester of 1928, a year after the publication of Being and Time, Heidegger has 
the following to say on how the things stand within the subjectivity of Dasein: “Only, 
one may not at this point reintroduce a common, subjectivistic concept of „subject.‟ 
Instead, the task is to see that being-in-the-world… precisely transforms the concept of 
subjectivity and of the subjective from the ground up” (Figal 78). Insofar as all the 
existential structures are features that characterize Dasein, then death is undoubtedly an 
element of Dasein‟s subjectivity, but only qua Dasein in its radical metaphysical 
neutrality.  
In another lecture from the same semester following the publication of Being and 
Time in 1928, Heidegger comments on the neutral designation intended for the term 
Dasein.  
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This neutral Dasein is thus also not the egocentrically singular, ontically 
isolated individual. The egoicity of the individual does not become the 
center of the entire problematic. Yet Dasein‟s essential content, to belong 
to itself in its existence, must be taken up along with the approach. To be 
sure, the approach that begins with neutrality implies a peculiar isolation 
of the human, but not in the factical existentiell sense, as if the one 
philosophizing were the center of the world. Rather, it is the metaphysical 
isolation of the human (Figal 63-64).  
 
The „subject‟ is traditionally the bearer of experience and already presumes the 
difference between my experience and your experience. 'Dasein' is specifically 
formulated to include the possibility that it can belong to the they. If one equivocates 
Dasein with subjectivity, then the fact that Dasein is initially and for the most part not 
itself would be relegated to an appearance of a reality. This would contradict Heidegger's 
insistence that the they is part of Dasein's positive ontological constitution. In order to 
situate „subjectivity‟ into the framework that Heidegger provides in Being and Time 
without revisiting its fundamental meaning, then because it already presumes Dasein‟s 
individuality of experience, it belongs to an existentiell discussion of how identity is a 
function of the existentials of being-in-the-world and being-with others. On the other 
hand, if we wish to say that „the metaphysical isolation of the human‟ is in any way 
synonymous with subjectivity, then we seem to lose the basis of similarity that Hoffman 
wants to say can be found between Heidegger and the Existentialists he compares him 
to. Either way, being-toward-death as an element of 'subjectivity' could not be the 
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4.7 Existential individuation and being-with  
If being-toward-death does not establish individuality with any subjective connotations, 
whether conceiving of Carman‟s factical particularity or Vogel‟s ontic solipsism, what 
kind of individuation is Heidegger referencing, if he‟s not being completely misleading 
by talking about individuation at all? The answer is existential, not existentiell 
individuation. Through being-toward-death, Dasein is individuated qua Dasein. And as a 
Dasein, both being-in-the-world and being-with others equiprimordially belong to its 
being. In anticipation, it is Dasein that is individualized as the being that it is with all the 
structures that pertain to it, not as a subjective „me‟ set against a „you‟. And that is 
because, as Francois Raffoul points out, "As Being-in-the-world with others, Dasein in 
itself lies, from the outset, beyond the opposition between the individual I and the other 
(the non- or alter-ego), beyond the opposition between egotism and altruism" (Raffoul 
213). Therefore, to become individualized as a Dasein cannot mean to demarcate a line 
between self and other. Near the end of the chapter on being-toward-death, Heidegger 
gestures towards this fact. He writes, “As the nonrelational possibility, death 
individualizes, but only, as the possibility not-to-be-bypassed, in order to make Dasein 
as being-with understand the potentialities-of-being of the others” (Heidegger 244). 
Anticipation individualizes Dasein as a being-with.  
The problem with identifying authenticity with the individuality of Dasein qua 
subjectivity, is that it associates all being-with with inauthenticity. This initially seems 
plausible because to be inauthentic is described as being a they-self: “Initially, „I‟ „am‟ 
not in the sense of my own self, but I am the others in the mode of the they” (Heidegger 
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121). But rather than imputing all of Dasein‟s social constitution, inauthenticity seems 
rather to point to the manner in which Dasein, projecting its possibilities for being, can 
surrender its own role of appropriating what it has understood in an understanding way 
for a tendency to accept public interpretedness. The they, that which is associated with 
inauthenticity, rather than referring to other Dasein, really refers to no one.  
Here it becomes clear that it is the mode of the „they‟ that constitutes a 
negation of alterity, since under its „dictatorship‟ the self and the other 
are, so to speak, the same. For, if is true that in this „same,‟ which is the 
neutrality of „no one and everyone,‟ the self finds itself subjugated to 
others, the others, too, disappear, as others… The reign of the 'They' thus 
proves itself to be the negation both of the singular existent and of others; 
the 'They,' says Heidegger, is properly 'nobody' (Raffoul 214).  
 
Inauthenticity, far from falling along a dichotomy between self and other, really 
constitutes a third category representing the nobody that Dasein is for the most part in 
accepting the dominant interpretedness that circulates in idle talk. Its association with 
Dasein‟s communal constitution is as a structure that arises from the “distantiality” of 
Dasein‟s being-with-one-another, but not suggesting that being-with is itself the cause of 
inauthenticity. And as Heidegger repeatedly reminds us, inauthenticity itself has no 
normative connotations, but rather belongs to the positive constitution of Dasein. The 
fact that Dasein is inauthentic for the most part is simply a reflection of the fact that 
Dasein is immersed in a world of possibilities the intelligibility of which it takes for 
granted. And in doing so, it covers over the fact that what grounds the intelligibility of 
what is possible is nothing other than the existential essence of Dasein, and it is therefore 
co-creating the truth of whatever it accepts.  
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Returning to the meaning of authenticity as it relates to the question of the 
meaning of being, authenticity was defined as the existentiell attestation that Dasein can 
manifest the transcendent structure of understanding. To fall prey to inauthenticity 
means simply that existentielly, Dasein is developing its possibilities in accordance with 
a principle external to it—the intelligibility of the they—thereby not manifesting that 
understanding has a transcendent structure. To say that Dasein is not individualized in 
this context means that it is not developing its possibilities out of its own being.  
Anticipation individualizes Dasein because it manages to thrust the intelligibility 
of its possibilities back onto its transcendent structure. It accomplishes this by projecting 
its possibilities towards their end, towards the very possibility of its possibilities, and in 
doing so, opens up the horizon of what is possible. Heidegger writes, “But being toward 
this possibility, as being-toward-death, should relate itself to that death so that it reveals 
itself, in this being and for it, as possibility… as one comes nearer understandingly, the 
possibility of the possible only becomes „greater‟” (Heidegger 242). The fact that dying 
is Dasein‟s ownmost possibility, and that Dasein is its possibility, are two sides of the 
same coin. The being-toward-death of anticipation is a projection towards possibility. 
And this possibility is what is ownmost about Dasein as the being whose ontic 
distinction is that it is ontological.  
 
4.8 Mineness  
The final point to consider is whether or not it is possible to completely eliminate a 
subjectivism from Being and Time when one of the two essential existential 
characteristic of Dasein from which the whole analytic unfolds is mineness. The very 
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fact that authenticity and inauthenticity both have their basis in mineness seems to set 
the stage perfectly for those who are already inclined to read authenticity as implying 
something fundamentally individualistic. Is it not the case that mineness directly 
establishes the essential subjectivism of Dasein‟s experience in the world?  
The very opening of Being and Time stresses the importance of mineness for 
what follows: “The being whose analysis our task is, is always we ourselves. The being 
of this being is always mine” (Heidegger 39). As one of two initial existential statements 
that forms the basis of the entire analytic of Dasein, all the existentials that follow suit in 
describing Dasein are equally structured by mineness. If understanding and its 
development in interpretation is also always mine, then in what sense is this to be 
understood except as establishing that the authentic development of Dasein‟s 
possibilities will be particular to it?  
To begin with, Heidegger writes, “Dasein is a being which I myself am, its being 
is in each case mine. This determination indicates an ontological constitution, but no 
more than that” (Heidegger 108). Identity, or answering the “who” of Dasein, is an 
existentiell question according to Heidegger. If mineness served to designate Dasein‟s 
existentiell disclosures as factically always its own, then mineness could no longer 
equally be the basis for inauthenticity, because inauthenticity is associated with the they. 
Inauthenticity would have to be explained along a Platonic scheme as an appearance of 
the authentic reality, making authenticity essentially an epistemological problem. The 
fact remains that existentielly speaking, Dasein is not always its own. Initially and for 
the most part, Dasein is ontically undifferentiated as the they. And this too has its basis 
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in mineness. Therefore, mineness has to come before a distinction of the „I‟ and selfhood 
and must encompass the possibility that Dasein is not itself in the they. As Heidegger 
confirms, “What if the fact that Dasein is so constituted that it is in each case mine, were 
the reason for the fact that Dasein is, initially and for the most part, not itself?” 
(Heidegger 109).  
There is another possibility for understanding mineness that suggests an opposite 
direction from the one above. Ultimately, the problem with the above interpretation of 
mineness is that it conceives of mineness as a predicate of a substantial being. Therefore, 
possibilities become mine because they belong to my Dasein. On the contrary, what 
seems to be the case is that possibilities become mine because my Dasein belongs to 
them through being. Rather than mineness acting as a principle that makes all of 
Dasein‟s possibilities its own by having brought them into the sphere of its being; 
instead, being itself brings mineness to the possibilities that Dasein exists as. Therefore, 
mineness is the principle that constitutes the basis of the self-identification with Dasein‟s 
possibilities. Francois Raffoul is particularly insightful on this point.  
This phrase should be understood literally: it is Being itself that is mine. 
And not 'I', then. I am only 'myself' through Being. Mineness is not the 
ontic individuality, the worldless self, or a self-consciousness that is 
closed upon its cogitationes, but is instead to be understood in the 
meaning of its Being, as the meaning of Being. (Raffoul 210-211).  
 
Mineness, rather than constituting the grounds of Dasein‟s individuation, is a 
determination of being. It is being itself that always has mineness, not „I‟ in terms of an 
ontic individuality. In this way, mineness comes before selfhood as the grounds of the 
possibility of all self-identification, including identification with the inauthentic they. 
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Whether or not as a possibility Dasein is undifferentiated in the they, as is the case in 
inauthenticity, mineness is the basis of Dasein identifying as that possibility for being. 
This effectively divorces the meaning of mineness from Dasein‟s existentiell 
possibilities as having any determining effect on what those possibilities mean. Whether 
or not the possibilities that Dasein exists as are ever factically particular to it, mineness 
has nothing to do with it. Mineness simply means that whatever possibilities Dasein 
exists as, Dasein cannot exist as those possibilities without identifying with them as its 
own.  
If, as was recognized above, Dasein is to be understood in a purely neutral sense 
suggesting not the ontically isolated individual but rather the metaphysical isolation of 
the human, then it is consistent that mineness too should carry a neutral designation of 
coming before all ontic determinations of selfhood. And because authenticity is based on 
mineness, placing mineness in its appropriate neutral, existential context frees 
authenticity from the requirement that its realization has anything to do with 
individualized possibilities for being a self.  
 
4.9 Conclusions  
By placing mineness in its proper context as a neutral determination of Dasein‟s being, 
this unravels the last thread supporting an individualistic-subjectivistic reading of the 
meaning of authenticity in Being and Time. As was already mentioned at the outset, the 
kind of proof that Being and Time offers is found in the coherence of its 
phenomenological reductions—between what shows itself in the phenomenon and the 
interpretation of that ground. Therefore, there is always a relatedness backwards and 
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forwards in the analytic. To argue for or against a particular reading of a theme in Being 
and Time also gets caught in placing all the supporting parts in their right context. In 
order to place the individualizing effect of anticipation in the right light, being-toward-
death and mineness had to be clarified as well.  
Perhaps in the very opening pages of Being and Time, in mineness as one of the 
two fundamental existentials from which the analytic unfolds, the prejudice towards a 
subjectivistic-individualistic reading of authenticity takes hold. From there, as was 
evident in Hoffman‟s exegesis of being-toward-death, Dasein is seen as individualized 
qua subjectivity, and the resulting implication for authenticity is the assumption of 
Dasein‟s ontic individuation or ontic solipsism. But taking this road only leads to 
problems in incorporating authenticity as radical individuation with all of the elements 
derived from the communal character of existence that Heidegger presents.  
An alternative account is that the individuation that pertains to authenticity on the 
basis of being-toward-death is that of the individuation of Dasein qua Dasein. Each 
Dasein is a locus of interpretation, even if its possibilities for being take shape from its 
context in being-with, and even if the intelligibility that makes sense of those 
possibilities derives from being-with others. These facts will not change as they are 
fundamental to every Dasein. Therefore, to become individualized does not subvert these 
facts. To be individualized means to realize (ontically) one‟s Dasein as a locus where the 
possibilities that Dasein exists as can be developed always towards their transcendence.  
Dasein was defined existentially as its possibility, and existentielly in terms of its 
possibilities. Authenticity, instead of pointing to a subject, rather points to an event 
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where a possibility is projected towards its dying—which can only happen in Dasein as 
being-toward-death—and therefore transcends the meaning of its possibility. Heidegger 
writes, “Anticipation discloses to existence that its extreme inmost possibility lies in 
giving itself up and thus shatters all one‟s clinging to whatever existence one has 
reached” (Heidegger 244). It is precisely in giving up its possibilities to their 
fundamental possibility that Dasein takes over its ownmost being from dispersal in the 
anonymous they. The they represents the substitution of recirculated answers for the 
authentic development of possibility that belongs to Dasein as its ownmost possibility. 
Only Dasein out of its ownmost being can push possibilities towards their transcendence.  
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CHAPTER V  
CONCLUSION 
 
Turning to a justification of the social-historical claims of Being and Time, we 
are in a better position to understand why it is that “The fateful destiny of Dasein in and 
with its „generation‟ constitutes the complete, authentic occurrence of Dasein” 
(Heidegger 352). By eliminating the notion that at the basis of what it means to be a 
Dasein is a fundamental subjectivity, Dasein‟s existential self-identifying rooted in its 
mineness actually pushes existentiell self-identity out into the possibilities that Dasein 
exists as. Absent a substantial self, Dasein experiences a fundamental multiplication in 
its factical existence. As Heidegger writes, “But here we are dealing with something 
else, with a description of the multiplication (not „multiplicity‟) that is present in every 
factically individuated Dasein as such” (Figal 64). Without a substantial self to hold all 
the pieces together, the essence of Dasein‟s being as possibility actually causes its self to 
be thrust into all of its possibilities.  
And as was evident in the elucidation of the existential of understanding, these 
possibilities that Dasein exists as are various, generally precede one‟s own Dasein, and 
include in their very constitution various levels of involvement with other Dasein. 
Therefore, the possibilities into which Dasein is thrown are constituted by social and 
historical dimensions; and in participating in these possibilities—in saying mine—
Dasein joins the others who are already there (Da- of Dasein) too. Therefore, the 
authentic development of Dasein‟s possibilities carries its own possibility of joining 
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together with its generation to bring about the transcendence of being. In his own 
remarks given afterwards on the project of Being and Time, Heidegger articulates this as 
the problem of “...how Dasein can exist as essentially free in the freedom of the factical 
ties of being-with-one-another” (Figal 65). In other words, what does this freedom that 
Dasein can exist as look like concretely when what it means to be human has been 
established on a new basis that combines being-with indissociably with being-in-the-
world? Whatever the possibilities for articulating this new conception for a free, 
authentic Dasein, what must be resisted is the thinking that pulls Heidegger's philosophy 
into traditional notions of subjectivity that conceive of being on the basis of objective 
presence, a tradition against which he is explicitly trying to formulate his contribution 
towards renewing the question concerning the meaning of being. 
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